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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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HISTORIC CHRISTIANITY AND THE SOCIAL QUESTION.

Coincident with the spread and organization of the Christian Church in the Roman Empire there arose in the minds of the more enlightened of its rulers the thought that a new and by no means negligible factor in the social and political affairs of mankind had made its appearance. Since that time the significance to society of a well-organized church has been a subject of thought and concern to reformers of all stripes as well as to rulers. Decius, one of the most statesmanlike of the third century emperors, "would more patiently and tolerantly hear that a rival prince was raised up against himself than that a priest of God was established (bishop) at Rome." [1] A recent author writing of a period sixty years later says: "It is idle to ask whether the Church would have triumphed even apart from Constantine. Some Constantine or other would have had to come upon the scene. Only, as one decade succeeded another it would be all the easier for anyone to be that Constantine." [2] From the day that Constantine took the momentous step here referred to until the present, no great figure in the political history of Europe has found it possible to ignore Christianity. All the Justinians, Charlemagnes and Napoleons, have sought to find some place for it in their schemes of government where it might strengthen their authority. As

[1] Cyprian, Ep. LV, 9.
[2] Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity*, Vol. II, p. 334.

long as the old conceptions regarding society and the state prevailed, and while rulers were considered to hold their powers by divine right or popular suffrage, the question of adjustment was comparatively simple.

Because of the development of the science of Economics in recent times, new ideas have gained currency not only concerning the character and constitution of society and the state, but of the origin of Christianity and its place and influence in history. The Transcendentalists, the Positivists, the Evolutionists all propounded their Philosophies of History and according to their respective principles explained or eliminated Christianity as a factor in progress. The attitude of the scholars who represented these various schools was always more or less academic and they were not compelled to trouble themselves regarding the fate of their theories if they eliminated the Christian religion. To the upholders of the Economic Interpretation of History who are for the most part propagandists as well as philosophers, the problem presents itself in a different light. They cannot fail to be aware that Christianity, though apparently in eclipse in some quarters, is a force that must still be reckoned with and that the socialist Decius of to-day may be succeeded by the socialist Constantine of to-morrow. Hence it is that while there are some who find in economic causes the sufficient key and explanation to early Christian history,[3] others less hostile, but perhaps not consistently with a strict interpretation of their own philosophy carry Christianity bodily to the socialistic camp, proclaiming that it was socialistic in its origin and in its early and uncorrupted days, and that the Christian fathers aiming at perfection in life and conduct gave expression to principles which contain the very essence of socialistic doctrine. The position of those who represent this moderate school of opinion is clearly stated by Gustave Le Bon. "During the first two or three centuries of our era the Christian religion was the socialism of the poor, of the déshérités, of the malcontents, and like modern socialism, it was in constant conflict with estab-

[3] Kautsky, *Der Ursprung des Christentums*, Stuttgart, 1908.

lished institutions. Christian socialism triumphed, and for the first time socialistic ideas obtained a notable victory." [4] How the fruits of this victory were lost and how this triumphant socialism abandoned its principles and its conquest, the author explains by saying it went the way of all successful revolutions: the acquisition of power and wealth produced conservatism and Catholic Rome pursued ideals not much different from those of the Rome of the Emperors.

It is useless to multiply citations on this point. The same or similar statements are found in the writings of many authors who have no socialistic leanings, and, except in a few cases, one does not get the impression that the writers are giving the result of their own explorations in the field of patristic literature. For this, however, they are scarcely to be blamed as the field is large and there are not many documents to be found there which deal professedly with things economic.

In discussing the attitude adopted towards society by the Christians, it will not be necessary as a preliminary to say anything regarding the principles of interpretation according to which socialistically-minded investigators find in the facts of Christian history the results of the working of economic causes. The problem can be stated in such a manner as to make a discussion of this sort unnecessary. In order that the point at issue may appear clear it is well to bear in mind that the Christian religion was first practiced in an alien and hostile environment, that after a long period of trial it triumphed and was finally associated with the civil authority in the hegemony of western civilization. During this long period numbers of earnest men strove by word and deed to give Christian standards of conduct the fullest expression. Remembering this the question may be asked: Were the ideals of Christian life advocated and practised by those leaders in the church of such a nature as to deserve being considered revolutionary of the existing social and political order, or would a society founded on such lines possess the characteristics advocated by the upholders of the modern socialistic or communistic idea?

[4] *Psychologie du Socialisme*, Paris, 1898, p. 12.

In attempting to find an answer to this question it is advisable to follow the lines laid down by all historians who have dealt with the question, and to make a sharp distinction between the attitude taken by the Christians in the Roman world before Constantine's Edict of Toleration, while they were felons before the law, and their attitude towards society and the state after they had ceased to labor under the disabilities removed by that edict.

Without attempting, therefore, either to discuss the Teaching of Our Lord on social questions or entering into any criticism of the principles of Socialism itself and striving solely to bring out with some degree of clearness what the attitude of Christians towards society was prior to the rise of organized socialism, it will be necessary in the first place to define their relation to existing conditions while paganism was still the religion of the state: to discuss their attitude at this time towards property, and wealth, and finally to attempt to ascertain whether the ascetical doctrines of individual perfection so freely advocated in the early church can be said to have had any influence as a social or economic force.

In the period after the Peace of the Church the investigation presents an entirely different aspect. Christianity in a short time superseded paganism as the religion of the State, asceticism found expression in organized monasticism, and the doctrines of faith and rules of conduct were gradually systematized and found expression in the great works of the Scholastics. Hence the most summary discussion of this subject will fall under six heads:—

1. Early Christianity and the then existing political structure.
2. The teaching of the Pre-Constantinian Church on Property and Wealth.
3. Asceticism as a social force.
4. The Economic aspects of organized monasticism.
5. The Church-Fathers on Property and Wealth.
6. Scholastic Theology as represented in St. Thomas and the Social Question.

I.

Early Christianity and the then existing Political Structure.

The special difficulties which are met with in attempting to arrive at a just estimate of the attitude taken by the early Christians towards the civilization by which they were surrounded come from two causes. In the first place the words of many Christian writers of the period are to be taken as expressing ideals rather than actual conditions, and in the second place the conditions such as we find them can at best represent only very inadequately the views of the faithful, who, could neither regulate the policy of the government which was striving to annihilate them, nor in despite of the government establish a social system in keeping with their own convictions. Nevertheless the Christians did have definite social ideals which found expression in their lives and which brought them into conflict with their rulers. From the character of this conflict as well as from their words and actions, we shall be enabled to judge whether the Christians under the rule of the pagan Cæsars deserved the epithets of rebel and innovator.

It is well at the outset to avoid a fundamental mistake made by some, who, attempting to gauge the character of Christian moral precepts, insist on their purely individualistic character. It is true that Christ required from all His followers personal perfection, but His prescriptions did not stop there, He required from them also fraternal relations, and it would be closing one's eyes on the plain truths of history to pretend that a great and profound social upheaval was not wrought in the world by the spread of the Gospel. To have stopped short at the individual and to have provided him with a higher form of religion and a more perfect code of individual morality, would have been only a partial reformation, if even that. The ancient world needed a social and economic as well as a reli-

gious and moral transformation and to have succeeded in bringing about a change so desirable is not the least of the achievements of Christianity.

It is one of the commonplaces of history that this transformation was not effected without bloodshed, but it is also one of the paradoxes of history that the Christian martyrs even though they effected a social revolution for which they paid with their lives were not political rebels in the strict sense of the word, nor in the slightest degree disloyal to the government which persecuted them. How this can be true and how the Christians can deserve credit for having elevated the tone of social and economic affairs in the Empire will be clear from an analysis of the causes which led to the struggle between them.

Stated in the briefest possible terms the causes of conflict and the insuperable obstacle to unity of action between the Christians and the pagans arose from their radically different concepts of religion and morality. The Christians believed in One God and looked on Polytheism and idolatry as supreme objects of reprobation, and they placed the goal of all effort in the attainment of moral perfection. Those fundamental differences touched every sphere of activity, and led, inevitably, to friction and violence. Paganism was in possession. It had penetrated every department of effort and colored every phase of life. Not only was public life inextricably bound up with the customs and rites of paganism, but domestic and social affairs were interwoven with constantly recurring acts of idolatry. Its symbols were everywhere, and the omnipresent statues gave constant pretexts for superstitious observances over and above the many formal sacrifices, libations and banquets which formed part of the national cult. Because of this widespread diffusion of paganism not only were many occupations closed to Christians, but it was impossible for them to participate in the social life and recreations of their neighbors. Tertullian though perhaps a rigorist, does not exaggerate in his treatise De Idololatria the difficulties and scruples which Christian carpenters, workers in stucco or gold or brass, joiners, slaters,

painters and engravers would frequently experience in the practice of their different trades. So, too, not only was it considered incompatible with the profession of Christianity to be an actor or a gladiator or a lanista, but it was forbidden to attend the theatre, the pantomimes and public spectacles,[5] because of "the way the whole business of the shows was dependent on idolatry." (Ex idololatria universam spectaculorum paraturam constare. Tert., *De Spec.*, IV.) For the same reason because of their connection with idolatry public banquets and frequently private festivals were repugnant to the Christian conscience.[6]

On the other hand the high moral aspirations of the Christians and their adherence to the requirements of their religion raised insuperable barriers between them and their pagan neighbors. It was impossible to condone the private and family life of the heathen, their utter absorption in degrading and vicious amusements, their disregard for the marriage tie, and their practices of infanticide, abortion and other unspeakable vices and crimes.

Thus by the very nature of their beliefs and practices the Christians were cut off from free intercourse with their neighbors in even the most ordinary affairs of daily life. It was impossible that such an attitude of aloofness could pass unnoticed and the resentment which it aroused found expression in frequently repeated accusations and assaults. The mob at all times easily finds reasons for violence, and the shocking tales which gained currency among the common people were repeated even by such men as Fronto of Cirta,[7] the teacher of Marcus Aurelius. The Christians were denounced as "skulking and shunning the light, silent in public but garrulous in corners." [8] They were spoken of as outcasts [9] who led gloomy and joyless lives,[10] whose language was barbarous,[10] who hated

[5] Minucius Felix, Oct., XII. Novatian, *De Spectaculis, passim.* Lactantius, *Instit.*, VI, 20–21. Arnobius, *Adv. Gent.*, IV, 35.

[7] His arguments are very probably to be found in the *Octavius* of Minucius Felix.

[8] Minucius Felix, *Octavius*, 8.

[9] Tertullian, *Ad Nat.* cii. Min. Fel., *Ibid.*

[10] Theoph. ad Autoly., I.

science and knowledge,[11] who belonged to a secret society into which they were initiated by the slaughter and blood of an infant, and who at their meetings were guilty of the most revolting acts of lewdness and uncleanness.[12]

Though these stories were picked up in the gutter, the fact that the apologists find it necessary constantly to refute them or others like them is clear evidence not only of the frequency with which they were repeated, but of the wide currency which they had obtained. In every case the accusations were met with blank denial and a challenge to prove that they contained a scintilla of truth. "You take no pains," says Tertullian, *Apol.*, chap. VII, "to elicit the truth of what we have been so long accused. Either bring, then, the matter to the light of day if you believe it, or give it no credit as having never inquired into it."

One striking thing in connection with this campaign of ridicule and villification is that the Christians were never called on to answer to a charge of disloyalty on the part of any of their body. Among the charges so industriously circulated against them they were never called rebels. So far, indeed, were the Emperors of the second century from considering that the accusations and attacks made on the Christians had any bearing on their loyalty as Roman citizens that Trajan, who would not for political reasons allow a company of firemen to be organized in Bithynia, ordered the Legate of that province not to go to the trouble of seeking out the Christians. The same course was followed by Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, who while far from wishing to protect the Christians did not think it necessary to take special steps to hunt them down. In fact the regulations they imposed on the governors of the provinces unquestionably tended to suppress mob violence against the Christians.

Superstition and hatred, however, prevailed over law and prudence. The ignorance of the people saw in the inundations of the Tiber, in the failure of the Nile to overflow its banks,

[11] Orig., *Contra Celsum*, III, 75.
[12] Min. Felix., *Oct.*, 9. Tertull., *Apol.*, I.

in the famines, wars and pestilence, manifestations of the anger of the gods because the Christians were tolerated, and the prudent reserve of magistrates and emperors was powerless in the face of popular fear and fury. The Christians were thrown to the beasts: but even then they could find safety by abjuring their faith, which is a resource not usually at the disposal of those who are accused of being enemies of the established order, political or social.

Even when brought before the tribunals the Christians were charged not with rebellion or disaffection of any sort, but with Atheism and Hatred of the Human Race. Atheism in the sense in which it was here employed meant, not that the Christians denied God, but that they refused to worship the gods of Rome. This charge unquestionably assumed somewhat of a political character when the test proposed to the Christians was that of doing homage to the Emperor as God. Without going into any discussion of the real motive of this imperial cultus or whether it would have been possible for the Christians to have made some compromise on this point in the interest of Roman imperial unity, they as a matter of fact absolutely repudiated Cæsar worship, being guided not by hostility to the ruler or the state but rather by their hatred of idolatry and state despotism in matters of religion.

The other charge, *Odium generis humani,* though perhaps not so frequently resorted to, was also political in import. It did not mean misanthropy or murderous anarchy but failure to conform fully to Roman standards of civilization. How far this was from constituting a proof of disloyalty was clear to the Christians themselves, who, conscious of their lack of sympathy with the institutional life around them, knew whence this discord arose and found in the cause to which they assigned it only additional evidence of their loyalty and devotion. "What the soul is in the body, that are Christians in the world. The soul is dispersed through all the members of the body, and Christians are scattered through all the cities of the world. The soul dwells in the body, yet is not of the body; and Christians dwell in the world, yet are not of the world.

The invisible soul is guarded by the visible body, and Christians are known indeed to be in the world but their godliness remains invisible. The flesh hates the soul and wars against it, though itself suffering no injury, because it is prevented from enjoying pleasures; the world also hates the Christians though in nowise injured, because they abjure pleasures. The soul loves the flesh and members that hate it, Christians likewise love those that hate them. The soul is imprisoned in the body yet preserves that very body; and Christians are confined in the world as in a prison, and yet they are the preservers of the world." [13]

That the action of the Roman authorities in persecuting the Christians offers no argument for questioning their absolute fidelity to the prevailing political and economic system is clear in the first place from the fact that all legislation against them found its root in sectarian animosity; that the innovations in matters of religion by many of the emperors themselves showed that even the rulers did not consider that the elimination of the old and the introduction of new deities endangered the Roman constitution: and finally because even at the time when anti-Christian feeling was bitterest, as during the third century, it was possible to abolish all tests and establish a *modus vivendi* which might easily have been made permanent.

Turning then to the other phase of the question we find the most overwhelming evidence that the Christians not only had no feeling of opposition to the Empire but that they prided themselves on their loyalty and their willingness to bear their share of the public burdens. In a passage as eloquent as the famous plea of Shylock, Tertullian says: "We are not Indian Brahmins or Gymnosophists, who dwell in woods and exile themselves from ordinary human life. We do not forget the debt of gratitude we owe to God our Lord and Creator; we reject no creature of His hands, though certainly we exercise restraint upon ourselves. So we sojourn with you in the world, abjuring neither forum, nor shambles, nor bath, nor booth, nor workshop, nor inn, nor weekly market, nor any other places of

[13] *Epistola ad Diognetum*, Chap. VI.

commerce. We sail with you and fight with you, and till the ground with you; and in like manner we unite with you in your traffickings—even in the various arts we make public property of our works for your benefit . . . . But if I do not frequent your religious ceremonies, I am still on the sacred day a man." [14]

Far from regarding the existence of the Empire as being in any way inimical to the interests of Christianity, the feeling among the faithful was that one was the necessary complement and sustaining adjunct of the other. With a political insight almost prophetic Melito of Sardis could say to the Emperor Marcus, while the Church was still feebly struggling for existence, that it was the sole power capable of sustaining the state. "For our philosophy . . . . having sprung up among the nations under thy rule during the great reign of thy ancestor Augustus, it became to thine empire especially a blessing of auspicious omen. For from that time the power of the Romans has grown in greatness and splendor. To this power thou hast succeeded, as the desired possessor, and such thou shalt continue with thy son, if thou guardest the philosophy which grew up with the Empire and which came into existence with Augustus. . . . And a most striking proof that our doctrine flourished for the good of an empire happily begun, is this—that there has no evil happened since Augustus' reign, but that on the contrary, all things have been splendid and glorious in accordance with the prayers of all." [15] The same thought is more strongly expressed by Tertullian who thinks the great shock impending over the whole earth is only retarded by the continued existence of the Roman Empire.[16]

It is not surprising, therefore, seeing that the Christians

[14] *Apology*, Chap. 42.

[15] *Apology, apud Eus., His. Eccles.*, IV, 26–7.

[16] *Apol.* Chaps. 32 and 39. See also, Hippolytus in *Dan.*, IV, 9, who does not take such a favorable view of the universal character of this Empire. The most important text on this subject is that of Origen, *Adv. Celsum*, III, XXIX, XXX, which is unfortunately too long to be cited here. The great Alexandrian takes a view of the political importance of the Christian Church which was valid not only for Rome but for all time.

entertained such views not only on government in general but regarding the Roman Empire in particular, that we find them constantly repeating the apostle's injunction "let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power but from God: and those that are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God." [17] No command is more explicitly inculcated in the Christian writings than this. Kings must be obeyed because their power is from above.[18] Civil authority is from God,[19] and civic allegiance knows no exception only when conscience is violated.[20]

Civic allegiance to those persecuted witnesses of the Christian faith meant something more than lip-service. It was an obligation of conscience imposed on them by their faith. Hence, we find them in all sincerity offering prayers for their rulers and the welfare of the state. That the subject was one which frequently occupied their thoughts is shown by the frequency with which it recurs in the writings of the time. More fully than any other author does Tertullian set forth the attitude taken by the Christians to their rulers. "We offer prayers for the safety of our princes to the eternal, the true, the living God, whose favor beyond all others, they must themselves desire. . . . We offer prayers without ceasing for all our Emperors; we pray for life prolonged; for security to the Empire; for protection to the imperial house; for brave armies, a faithful senate, a virtuous people, the world at rest, whatever, as man or Cæsar, an Emperor would wish." [21] That prayers for the rulers formed part of the regular liturgical service of the Christians is clearly testified further on: "We meet together as an assembly and congregation, that, offering up prayer to God as with united force, we may wrestle with Him in our supplications. We pray, too, for the Emperors, for their ministers and for all in authority, for the welfare of the world, for the prevalence of peace, for the delay of the final consummation." [22] Time after time Tertullian returns to the same

[17] Rom., XIII, 12.
[18] Athenagoras, *Legatio*, XVIII.
[19] Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.*, V, 24.
[20] Theophilus ad Autolycum, XI.
[21] *Apol.*, Chap. XXX.
[22] *Ibid.*, Chap. XXXIX.

theme. "A Christian is enemy to none, least of all to the Emperor of Rome, whom he knows to be appointed by his God, and so cannot but love and honor, and whose well-being, moreover, he must needs desire, with that of the empire over which he reigns so long as the world shall stand—for so long as that shall Rome continue." [23] He sums up the situation by saying: "On valid grounds I might say Cæsar is more ours than yours, for our God has appointed him. Therefore as having this property in him, I do more than you for his welfare . . . . because in keeping the majesty of Cæsar within due limits, and putting it under the Most High, and making it less than divine, I commend him the more to the favor of deity, to whom alone I make him inferior." [24] Proscription and persecution did not cause the Christians to waver in those sentiments of loyalty and devotion, and serene in their confidence of carrying out a divine behest, they prayed in times of adversity as well as of peace. "Pray," says Polycarp, "for kings and potentates, and princes." [25] "Night and day," says Cyprian to the persecutor Demetrian, "we pour forth our prayers for your peace and salvation." [26]

Though fully conscious of their ability successfully to defy the government, the Christians never sought to be revenged for the sufferings they were made to undergo, nor revolted against lawful authority. "If we desired," said Tertullian, "to act the part of open enemies, not merely of secret avengers, would there be any lacking in strength, whether of numbers or resources." [27] This feeling of loyalty and subjection was so deeply ingrained in the Christian conscience that we find the martyrs at the moment of their condemnation not only not expressing any desire for retaliation or revenge for their sufferings, but praying for the welfare and safety of their rulers.[28]

[23] *Ad Scapulam*, Chap. II. [24] *Apol.*, Chap. XXXIII.

[25] Ep. ad Phillipians, Chap. 12.

[26] Ad Demetrianum, Chap. XX. See also Clem. Rom., *Ep. ad Cor.*, 60-61. Minucius Felix, *Oct.*, XXIX. Tertull. *Scorpiace*, XIV. Origen, *Contra Cel.*, VII, 65.

[27] *Apol.*, Chap. 37. Ad Scapulam, Chap. 5.

[28] See Passio SS. Scilitanorum. Passio Perpetuae et Felicitatis, Chap. VII. Acta Proconsularia S. Cypriani, Chap. II.

Finally, there is no test by which loyalty and civic virtue can be judged, that will condemn the Christians of the pre-Constantinian period. They paid their taxes promptly and without complaint. "And everywhere we, more readily than all men, endeavor to pay to those appointed by you the taxes both ordinary and extraordinary, as we have been taught by Him: for at the time some came to Him and asked Him, if one ought to pay tribute to Cæsar, He answered . . . . Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and to God the things that are God's." [29] "Does the sovereign order the payment of tribute" says Tatian. "I am ready to render it." [30] Tertullian insists that the Christians had the same scruples against defrauding the government of its revenue that they had against practising dishonesty against their own brethren.[31]

In addition to bearing their due share of the burden of taxation and contributing to the support of the government the Christians gave still further evidence of the sincerity of their professions of loyalty by the large share they took in the administrative affairs of the government. There were many reasons why they should have had no part in public life. Their ranks were recruited largely, but by no means exclusively, from among the poor and lowly, and their faith was a bar to any participation whatsoever in idolatrous rites. Public life in pagan Rome was completely interwoven with polytheistic practices, and because of this officials of all grades were constantly called on in the exercise of their duties to perform acts of idol worship. Senators, Consuls, Praetors, Questors were all bound by the same regulations and could not, except at the risk of denunciation, avoid sharing in pagan worship or providing feasts or games or gladiatorial shows in honor of the gods. In many cases especially as regards provincial governors they were charged with the maintenance of the temples. These and other considerations unquestionably caused many Christians to withdraw from public life. "We are not all from the lowest class if we do refuse your honors and your purple robes," was the answer of

[29] Justin, I. *Apol.*, Chap. XVII.
[30] Adv. Graecos, V.
[31] *Apol.*, Chap. 42.

Minucius Felix to those who accused the Christians of being poor and outcasts.[32]

Despite the great dangers involved in holding public office some means were devised by which a compromise was adopted or by which Christians were saved from violating their convictions. Even Turtullian declares himself in favor of the practice under certain conditions. "And so let us grant that it is possible for any one to succeed in coming forward with the mere title of the office without either sacrificing or lending the sanction of his presence to a sacrifice, without farming out the supply of sacrificial victims; not assigning to others the care of temples; not looking after their tributes; not giving spectacles at his own or the public charge; or presiding at such spectacles; proclaiming or announcing no ceremony, without taking any oaths; . . . . supposing all that to be possible then there is no reason why a Christian should not be an official." [33]

Notwithstanding these difficulties and restrictions we find that from the earliest days there was an ever increasing number of the faithful who devoted themselves to the service of the state, to say nothing of the large number of Christians to be found at court, the Cæsarians.[34] There were consuls, like Acilius Glabrio and Flavius Clemens, senators like Apollonius, Curiales, Magistrates and people of "every order," as Pliny says, so that Tertullian's boast that the Christians were filling the camp, the town council, the palace, the Senate, the Forum,[35] was more than idle rhetoric. If all other evidence should fail we have sufficient proof of the extent to which the Christians had gained admission to the public service from the Edict issued by Valerian in 258. More clearly than a mere enumeration of names or numbers this edict ordering that "Senators and prominent men and Roman knights should be stripped of their property," proves how numerous Christian public officials were in the middle of the third century. Less than half a century later, as we learn from Eusebius,[36] "The Em-

[32] Octavius, Chap. XXXI.
[33] De Idololatria, 17.
[34] Harnack, *Mission and Expansion*, Vol. II, p. 48.
[35] *Apol.*, Chap. XXXVII.
[36] H. E., VIII, I.

perors trusted Christians with provinces to govern and exempted them from the duty of offering sacrifice," and in one town in Phrygia at the same time all the inhabitants and all the magistrates were Christians.

Finally the supreme evidence of good citizenship and fidelity to Roman institutions was that afforded by the manner in which Christianity permeated the army.[37] There more than elsewhere in the public service a Christian would be exposed to the danger of apostasy. Because of this and because of the large number of Christians in the army there was proposed for the consideration of Christian moralists the question whether a Christian could consistently be a soldier. Rigorists, like Tertullian and Origen and Lactantius, might find some incompatibility between military service and Christian faith, but their protests were unavailing, and Christians were found in all the legions. In fact so numerous were they that at one time they were exempted from the duty of sacrifice,[38] and later made the object of a special edict of persecution. Their fidelity to the Empire was shown by the fact that though frequently tried they never revolted and their faith was attested by the frequency with which they laid down their lives in its defence. No class produced more martyrs than the army.

Thus viewing the early history of the Christians under every relation in which they stood to the state and society, we may conclude that they never dreamt of destroying or even changing the existing social and political structure. No word of protest was raised against the forms of government, except in so far as these favored polytheism and immorality. The constitution of Rome did not of itself impose any burdens on the Christians, they were content with it and never gave any indication of a desire to withdraw and establish a separate state.

If the Christians were innovators it was because they insisted on a more rigid observance of the law, because they taught a higher citizenship, and because they strove to eliminate the very evils which called forth the denunciations of even

[37] Harnack, *Militia Christi in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten*, 1905.
[38] Eusebius, H. E., VIII, 6–8.

pagan satirists and publicists. By the spread of the Gospel a profound and far-reaching reform was effected, but it was brought about within the old political and economic framework. The office which Constantine filled did not differ from that of his predecessors because he assumed the protectorate of the Church. No constitutional change can be attributed to the triumph of Christianity. Everything went on as before, except that the pure worship of the Church had driven out the disgraceful orgies associated with the pagan Pantheon; that faith had supplanted philosophy as the guide of conduct, and that human life had received a new value. Membership in this new kingdom was not restricted to the poor, nor were the faithful of those days antimilitarists nor committed to the Tolstoyan doctrine of non-resistance. They took up the burdens of citizenship just as they found them, and if they strove to remedy existing ills, these were religious not political, moral not economic. Hence it can be nothing but a perversion of the plainest truths of history to see in the conduct of the early Christians anything that can in the slightest degree be regarded as a socialist movement against the then prevailing economic or political conditions.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

ST. THOMAS AND THE WILL TO BELIEVE.

History has often witnessed the splitting up of a movement of thought into opposing factions. It is almost an established law that any idea, any system, any school, has, from its very inception, the germs of its own dissolution. Division is followed by division till the power of the system is exhausted and it gradually loses its hold upon the present and sinks back into the history of the past. What is true of single systems and schools of thought holds also of eras which last through centuries. Great minds are followed by little minds, till over vast areas and through the little rivulets of a delta, the rushing torrents which came from the high levels of a noble past are lost in the low plains of an effete and stagnant century. So it was with Grecian Philosophy. Such too was the fate of Middle Age Scholasticism. None other need be expected by the glorious era of modern research, although its truths and those with which men built their faulty systems in ages past are eternal.

Already there has appeared a dualism, evident indeed of growth, but the presage of future decay. This dualism has appeared in spite of the bright hope of unity which the modern method of observation seemed to hold out. Observation, the final test of validity, has done much to unify results in science, but it is not a method of universal application. The general introduction of this method distinguishes the modern era from the old. Even the beginnings of the humanistic movement were due to the craving of men to see and observe for themselves the glories of antiquity. The yearning to observe soon extended beyond the domain of letters, and has not ceased to characterize the modern era, since Galileo looked at the satellites of Jupiter with his telescope and Vesalius turned from the text-book of Galen to study the human body. How could it be that such a method would ever lead to divided and contradictory results? Do not all those who see with normal eyes

see alike? To some extent they do, and were it not that it is the man who sees and not his eye, were it not also that there are different classes of men, all would see alike, and our method of observation would lead everywhere to perfect agreement. Unfortunately, however, there is a class of men that claim they see all that can be seen and what remains will never be seen. Another class holds right stoutly that all things visible can be seen. Nothing more is seen because there is nothing more to be seen. Here, then, is the dualism of the modern world, which is at once a witness to its growth and the warning of its future disintegration. Religion fares ill on each side of the divided field. If she turns to the former, she finds her proffered offerings relegated to the dark shadows of the unknowable. And if, leaving that ground, she goes to the latter, her choicest gifts are snatched from her by ruthless and unthinking hands who tear in pieces what they cannot understand. One class of men say certain knowledge about the higher truths is impossible. The other would explain our entire religious life by the same laws of motion whereby they hope to make the whole universe fall under the sway of some all-embracing mathematical equation.

Both these positions are difficulties of reasoning, one in excess, the other in defect. Both are rooted in the fundamental assumptions of the modern era, that every phenomenon must be explained by Galileo's laws of motion. Neither one nor the other can be harmonized with Faith, which is built upon the possibility of a moral obedience and involves the concept of a liberty that transcends the mechanism of the Universe.

Science is constructed out of the sensible, palpable world. Its object has been prosecuted since the formation of the laws of motion with an ever increasing success. Its methods have been applied, not to nature alone, but to every branch of human learning, until now no student can touch a piece of research who does not feel that there is imposed upon him the fundamental assumption of the age. What is that assumption? It is this: Every phenomenon can be explained by mechanical law. If any occurrence seems to escape such an explanation, it is

either falsely recorded or its interpretation is impossible for lack of data.

It is easily seen that our Christian religion cannot stand on the same ground with this assumption. Clip and prune the legends of the Saints as much as you will. Cut away from the deposit of Faith all the accretions of centuries till only that which is certainly *de fide* remains. It will still be evident that Christianity and any universal mechanical theory are incompatible and forever irreconcilable. Granting that such an assumption were true, where then would be the provident care of a loving God for His children who labor on earth? What then would become of the central doctrine of our religion, the Incarnation of God, the Virgin Birth of our Lord, his miracles and his glorious Resurrection? Where would be our moral freedom and that superiority to temptation which endows our character with the transcendent perfection of triumph over sin?

Living as we do in the atmosphere of the age, the weight of this assumption bears heavily upon us. We cannot help feeling its pressure, and all unconsciously it works its way into our opinions—not by strength of reason, but by dint of its constant activity. For who has explained the universe of nature and of morals by any system of mechanism? Or who can hold out any serious hope that all things will be so explained? At the same time where is the religious minded man acquainted with modern research who has never felt the insistence of modern difficulties? Does it not happen at times that the mists of worldly disputes penetrate even into the sanctuary of the soul, enveloping our ideals in shadows, clouding the vision for a moment, obscuring, perhaps even eclipsing the glory that shines from the eternal Truth Who illumines our minds by the rays of Faith? Thus does God prove his servants. We suffer the sting of doubt, that through many tribulations we may enter at last into the Kingdom of Heaven.

It is only natural that we should look for aid and light on the problems that confront us. This we find all unconsciously in those about us who have the same burdens to bear and the same problems to solve. Their life and example work upon

us in proportion to the nobility of their being. In history we find the same source of consolation. All through its pages we meet with men who have been perplexed and puzzled as much and more than we have ever been. Their writings remain. The brilliancy of their genius still shines through the ages. The nobility of their endeavors still spurs their fellow men to higher things. The tide of their thought rolls on and bears us along with it to the happy shores of their haven in eternity.

From out this goodly company, rises preëminent the Angel of the Schools, St. Thomas Aquinas. None more sensitive than he to the insidious menace of worldly sophistry. With St. Paul he could say (*II Cor.*, xi, 29) "Who is weak and I am not weak? Who is scandalized and I am not on fire?" Such was his marvelous ability to give the utmost possible strength, in his statement of them, to the theories he combatted. And none more perenduring than he in his influence for good. For there are rivers that have no delta country. Like the majestic St. Lawrence of our Northern boundary their pellucid waters flow from the snows of their birthplace into the ocean, untainted and undiminished, because contained within banks of imperishable granite. Such has been the happy history of the example and doctrine of St. Thomas. Having for his teacher the Crucifix, his learning has merited perpetuation through God's indefectible Pillar and Ground of Truth, the Holy Catholic Church, whose devoted sons may always be trusted to give voice to his wisdom in every crisis of the world's thought.

The answer of St. Thomas to the riddle of belief is not transient, suited to the needs of one age and obsolete as soon as a generation has pasesd away. He did not merely reply to this or that question of his day, as one sophist might solve the difficulties of another. His was a higher task, his the work of a true Philosopher, the knowledge of things in their ultimate causes. His view of Faith aids us now with all the difficulties of modern science pressing upon us simply because it is the vision of its true essence made known in the light of revelation.

The doctrine of St. Thomas on Faith is founded upon the

perception of the profound psychological truth that the opinions of mankind are not solely determined by processes of formal logic. Scholasticism recognizes that the errors of human judgment do not come entirely from the intellect. A will that is subject to the impulses of its emotional life can lead the intellect into error.[1] The mind may be mistaken because of a lack of due attention to the grounds of its assent. Still, even in this case, if one would ask whence the hurried judgment, why is the mind made up before it has time to think, the answer must be because there is a desire to come to some conclusion and under the influence of emotion a hasty judgment is passed. If logic alone determined our conclusions, all men would think alike. Recognizing, as St. Thomas did, that as a matter of fact, the opinions of men are dependent on their emotions, it is not surprising for us to find that in his analysis of faith, the intellect is not the ultimate court of appeal. It is indeed the intellect that believes, for faith is but the beginning of that intellectual vision of God which will constitute our blessedness in Heaven. Even now God, the first Truth, shines upon our souls, producing the supernatural act of Faith as light gives rise to the vision of color, and as the demonstration effects in our minds the proper conclusion.[2] But we see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. (*I Cor.*, XIII, 12) "But vision is of the intellect, therefore faith as well." [3]

[1] Ex aliquo extrinseco ratio deficit, cum propter vires inferiores quae intense moventur in aliquid intercipitur actus rationis, ut non limpide et firmiter suum judicium de bono voluntate proponat.

Questiones Desputatae. De Veritate XXIV, § viii. corpus.

[2] Respondeo: Dicendum quod nihil subest alicui potentiae, vel habitui aut etiam actui, nisi mediante ratione formali objecti, sicut color videri non potest, nisi per lucem, et conclusio sciri non potest, nisi per medium demonstrationis. Dictum est autem quod ratio formalis objecti fidei est veritas prima, unde nihil potest cadere sub fide, nisi inquantum stat sub veritate prima, sub qua nullum falsum stare potest.

2. 2. Q. I, § iii.

[3] Sed contra est quod fidei succedit visio patriae secundum illud primae ad Corin. 13. *Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate tunc autem facie ad faciem*; sed visio est in intellectu, ergo et fides.

2. 2. Q. IV, § ii.

Because the vision of Faith is as yet dark, its acts are not necessitated by the Divine Light which shines upon the soul. At the same time it is not the operations of the understanding which determine the assent of Faith. If so, Faith would no longer be Faith but knowledge. "The reasons," says St. Thomas, "which are brought forward by holy writers to prove those things which are of Faith are not demonstrations but certain persuasive arguments which show that what is taught by Faith is not impossible or they proceed from the principles of Faith." [4] Since Faith cannot be logically proved by that which is of Faith, it would therefore follow that the act of Faith is not determined by the premises of the arguments [5] by which it is supported, but that over and above the force of such arguments there must be another factor, distinct not only from the Divine action, but also from the operations of the understanding. This factor is not, however, the blind passions and emotions which urge on the intellect to hurried judgments when evidence is lacking. In the act of Faith the intellect is not dominated by sub-conscious mental processes, nor by the feelings which are so fruitful in error, but by the will, whose operations belong to that same high level of mental activity whereon the acts of the understanding reside in transcendence of the data of sense and the motions of desire and the cloudy regions of the passions. "The intellect of him who believes is not determined to assent by reason but by the will." [6] In fact, it is because the will commands the intellect that Faith can be called a virtue in the strict sense of the word. "The intellect," says St. Thomas, "can be the subject of virtue properly so called, because of its relation to the will. In this way the speculative intellect or reason is the subject of Faith. For by the sway of the will the intellect is moved to assent to

[4] 2. 2. Q. I, § V ad 2.

[5] Fides non habet inquisitionem rationis naturalis demonstrantis id, quod creditur, habet autem inquisitionem quandam eorum, per quae inducitur homo ad credendum, puta, quia sunt dicta a Deo et miraculis confirmata. . . . . Intellectus credentis determinatur ad unum non per rationem sed per voluntatem. 2. 2. Q. II. § i. ad. 1 et 3.

[6] 2. 2. Q. II, § i. ad 3.

those things which are of Faith. For no one believes unless he wants to." [7]

Can it be that one who lays so much stress on the dignity of human reason, as does St. Thomas, holds that in what concerns most deeply the destiny of man the human mind may assent or not according as it wills? St. Thomas says, Yes. Is, then, St. Thomas a Pragmatist? In the current sense of the word, No. He does not say that men may legitimately believe anything they will and what they believe is true because they will it, but only that if they do believe it is not because they are forced by the evidence. Belief follows upon a choice which they are at perfect liberty to make. Our will to believe does not make that which we believe true. It simply determines our assent to a truth which exists independently of our belief, which was true before we believed and which always will be true whether we continue to believe or not. What is proposed for the assent of Faith, not only appears to us as true but also as supremely good. Therefore the will exercises its dominion over the hesitating intellect and commands it to assent. This, says St. Thomas,[8] is the obedience of Faith by which every intellect is made captive to Christ. (*II Cor.*, x, 5.)

The temper of modern thought suggests the question: In what sense is this obedience of the intellect justifiable. One is likely to feel an aversion to the attitude of St. Thomas simply because of a confusion which may exist in the mind between emotion and will, desire and duty. But St. Thomas does not make the assent of Faith depend upon emotions and desires, as has already been pointed out. We do not, we should not, assent because of party prejudice, even though in so doing we are partisans of the Church Militant of God on earth.

The strength of the position held by St. Thomas concerning the obedience of Faith depends on his solution of a more fundamental problem: Is obedience ever free? St. Thomas approaches [9] this difficulty by an appeal to fact. Freedom con-

[7] 1. 2. Q. LVI. § iii. The last phrase is referred to St. Augustine (26 in Joann. super illud; *nemo potest venire.* tome 4) in Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate XIV. § i. corpus C.

[8] De Veritate XIV, § i, corpus.

[9] 1. 2. Q. VI, § i.

sists in perceiving the end and accomplishing the act in virtue of the power that is resident in one's self.[10] It is a fact of experience that some actions are accomplished by us in just this way. We exist in a social order. From this social order arise duties. Whatever may be our metaphysical theory of life, it is a fact that we perceive these duties and act in the light of the perception of an end revealed to us by reason.[11]

We may pause here to consider an analogy between St. Thomas and Kant. Both arrive at the concept of freedom from similar points of view. St. Thomas points to the system of ends in which the human will finds itself *de facto* involved. Kant points to the concept of responsibility which arises from the duty (in Thomistic terminology, the end, *finis*) which each individual has to perform; for both alike, freedom is a necessary consequence of these fundamental concepts.

Returning to the thread of our argument, it becomes evident that if there are moral beings in the world, then the universe in its entirety is not a mechanical system. Side by side with the machinery of the cosmos there exists the moral order, and in this moral order live and move and have their being a race of free and responsible human agents. Their end, their duty, is the pursuit of goodness. From their existence the fact of moral goodness is immediately evident. This moral goodness does not exist in the abstract but always as something good. It is man's duty, therefore, to seek that which is good, and if the good, then the Highest Good. If man must seek the supreme goodness, and if the intellect manifests to him that which is supremely good, then he must choose it.

The intellect cannot stand in the way with the assumptions of its methods of research nor with objections based upon the universality of the mechanical law of nature, for this law is not universal. There is another and a higher law, a law which has paramount claims as a fact of experience, the law which

[10] 1. 2. Q. 1, § i.

[11] The entire discussion of the end of human actions and happiness (beatitudo) of man in the first questions of the Prima Secundae make these points abundantly evident.

lays an obligation upon its free and responsible subjects to see and understand the ultimate end of their existence in this world and to tend to that end by the exercise of powers inherent within themselves.[12] Such was the formulation in Scholastic terms of that which Kant in a later day termed the Categorical Imperative. By this demonstration of a moral order and a transcendental freedom St. Thomas gave centuries ago the essentials of the answer which is effective today against the assumption that nothing can be known with certainty except that which can be seen and tested within our laboratories.

Do what we may, we cannot get out of the complex system of the ends of human actions. As long as we are members of a social order we have duties to ourselves, to our fellow-men and to God. The pressure of human obligation upon a member of the social order is more insistent and weighs more heavily upon him than the logical assumptions of the age. The freedom which all this implies is the most certain of facts and it is irreconcilable with the system of materialism which those hold who think they can see and explain all things in terms of motion. At the same time it contradicts the Agnostic position that freedom and all such transcendental truths are unknown and forever unknowable. The certainty of freedom, on which the obedience of Faith rests, is the consolation which in our perplexities and doubts we receive from St. Thomas Aquinas.

One more idea is necessary for the fulness of the Thomistic concept of Faith. The act of will by which the intellect is commanded to assent is the same voluntary choice by which the soul cleaves to God in preference to all the things of this world.[13] "There is a two-fold ultimate good of man," says St. Thomas, "which as a final end is the prime mover of the will. One is commensurate with human nature because the natural powers suffice to obtain it, and this is that happiness

[12] Cf. 1. 2. Q. vi. § i.

[13] Manifestum est autem ex praedictis, quod actus fidei ordinatur ad objectum voluntatis, quod est bonum, sicut ad finem. Hoc autem bonum quod est finis fidei, scilicet bonum divinum, est proprium objectum charitatis: et ideo charitas dicitur forma fidei in quantum per charitatem actus fidei perficitur et formatur. 2. 2. Q. iv. § iii. Cor.

of which the Philosophers have spoken. . . . The other good of man surpasses the power of human nature because our natural strength does not suffice to obtain it—nor to conceive of it nor desire it. Only by the generosity of God is it promised to man." ("Eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man what things God hath prepared for them that love Him." *I Cor.*, II, 9.) This is eternal life and by this good the will is inclined to believe those things which it holds through Faith. Hence St. John (VI, 40) says: "He who sees the Son and believes in Him, he has eternal life." [14]

There is no real break between the life of Faith and the Life Eternal, for "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." (*Heb.*, XI, 1.) The substance of things to be hoped for, because it is essentially the same as our blessedness in Heaven. "This is eternal life," said Our Lord in the prayer for His disciples, "that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." (*St. John*, XVII, 3.) Already in the dark knowledge of Faith we have the substance of eternal Glory.

It is the evidence of things that appear not. It leads us to knowledge. Therefore it is evidence. But it does not demonstrate that which we believe, and so the doctrines of Faith are known, and still they appear not.

Deep is the spiritual import of this concept of faith, and consoling to him who loves God and spiritual things. As the soul grows in prayer it approaches nearer and nearer to eternal life. Its Faith grows ever stronger. A new vision is dawning within the mind. That which the powers of logic could never accomplish growth in spiritual perfection brings about with ease. The reason for this is, that the act by which the will commands the intellect to assent to that which is of Faith is the same act by which it consecrates itself to God. It follows, then, that anything, little or great, which interferes with the communion between our soul and God, to that extent is a weak-

[14] De Veritate XIV. § ii. Corpus.

ening of the bond of Faith. "Therefore there are many infirm and weak among you, and many sleep." (*I Cor.*, xi, 30.)

Let us tarry no longer in things temporal that blind our vision and pass away and leave us wandering to and fro and carried about by every wind of doctrine (*Eph.*, iv., 14). Step by step with the fleeting moments of time we trudge on to the life beyond the grave. That life is inevitable. Let us then delay no longer with the makeshifts of the hour and the bewitching of trifling, but set out at once in the dim twilight of Faith along the road which leads to our Eternal Good, God, the First Truth Who quickens with hope the dark night of the soul.

Thomas Verner Moore, C. S. P.

THE TENDENCY OF RECENT WORK ON THE SYNOPTIC PROBLEM.

Of late years an immense amount of labor has been expended on the Synoptic Problem, and though it may safely be said that no solution will ever claim the suffrages of the whole body of critics, it is yet certain that the thorough and painstaking investigations which are now occupying so many scholars cannot be without fruit. Confining ourselves to England we need only mention the names of such scholars as Wright, Hawkins, Stanton, Sanday, and Allen. All these have devoted a great deal of time to the examination of the Gospels with a view to arriving at some acceptable statement which shall embrace all the facts of the problem.

We are not going to discuss here [1] the various theories which have been propounded; we wish rather to dwell upon one point in recent methods of investigation which calls, we think, for comment.

While earlier theories involving the elaboration of one or more 'Ur-Marcus' are on their way to extinction and the 'Requiem' of the 'Ur-Marcus' has been sung, there is an ever-growing consensus of opinion that our Second Gospel, viz., S. Mark in its present state, is the foundation of the First and Third Gospels. We hold no brief for or against this view, strong arguments on both sides can be brought forward; but we feel that the line of argument adduced in its support has of late taken a turn which is hardly in accord with sound principles of exegesis.

The argument in favor of the view that the present Second Gospel is the base of the First and Third rests on the minute and careful statistics published by Hawkins in his *Horae Synopticae*.[2] Scholars have freely availed themselves of the

[1] For a very compact summary of these, see Jackson: *The Present State of the Synoptic Problem;* Cambridge Biblical Essays, 1909.

[2] *Horae Synopticae,* Hawkins. Oxford. 2nd ed., 1909.

material thus accumulated and there is a tendency nowadays to regard the whole function of the commentator on S. Matthew as merged in that of the mere tabulator of the steps by which the First Gospel has absorbed into itself the Second. This is particularly noticeable in Mr. Allen's volume on S. Matthew in the *International Critical Commentary*.[3] The opening words of the author's Introduction strike the note of the whole subsequent Commentary:—"Almost the entire substance of the second Gospel has been transferred to the first." In support of this Mr. Allen brings forward an immense amount of evidence covering pages xiii-xxxv of his Introduction. He concludes by saying:—

> "It is hoped that the facts collected above will be sufficient to convince the reader that of the two Gospels, that of S. Mark is primary, that of S. Matthew secondary. They seem to point all in the same direction. That is to say, whilst it is not inconceivable that such changes should have been made by a later writer in the text of Mark, it is extremely improbable that the author of the second Gospel should have been dependent on the first, and have made the changes in the reverse direction. From every point of view, whether it be of linguistic style, of reverence for Christ, of esteem for His Apostles, or of consideration for the reader, the alterations made by Mt. give the impression of belonging to a later stage of Evangelic tradition as compared with that represented by Mk. Isolated cases may seem open to question, but anyone who reads through the first Gospel with Mk. before him, asking himself why it is that Mt. differs from the second Gospel, will, I believe, be led to the conclusion that, taken as a whole, his deviations from Mk's text can only be explained as due to motives which interpenetrate every part of his work." [4]

[3] *The International Critical and Exegetical Commentary.* The Gospel of S. Matthew, by W. C. Allen. Clark, 1907.

[4] P. xxxv.

In other words: modern students of the Synoptic Problem, having convinced themselves of the dependence of Mt. on Mk., have perforce to cast about for an explanation of the diverse presentation by Mt. of material he derived in substance from Mk. And once granting that Mt. is dependent on Mk. some explanation of the divergencies from his 'source' which Mt. has apparently thought fit to allow himself is urgently called for. The Tübingen School sought the explanation of many Gospel problems in the existence of what they were pleased to call the rival Pauline and Petrine parties of the Second century. Critics have now consented to push back the dates of the Gospels into the First century [5] and they seek to explain the varying presentation of the data not so much by the individual prepossessions of the Evangelists as by the demands of the second generation of Christians who called for a presentation of Christ and His Apostles which should accord with the dogmatic notions due to the catechetical teaching they had received.

Thus Mr. Allen, after an examination of S. Luke's relation to the other two Gospels concludes that: "of these changes many of the more important might well be due to independent revision of Mk. by Mt. and Lk., *especially those relating to Christ and His Apostles.*[6] It is evident that contemplation of the life of the Lord, and reflection upon His Person and work, and all that it meant for human life; and the deepening reverence that springs spontaneously from the life of meditation upon His words, and from spiritual communion with Him, and from worship of God in His name, was gradually leading Christian writers to refine and purify, partly to make careful choice of the language in which they described His life. In connexion with His Sacred Person the choicest words only must be used, choicest not for splendor or beauty of sound or of suggestion, but as conveying in the simplest and most direct way the greatest amount of truth about Him with the least admixture of wrong emphasis. In this respect the Synoptic

[5] Cf. Jackson, *l. c.*, p. 440.
[6] Italics ours.

Gospels present in miniature the same process that afterwards took place on a larger scale in the history of the creeds. Already the Gospel writers found themselves committed to the task of describing the life of One whom they knew to have been a truly human Person, whom yet they believed to have been an incarnation of the Eternal. The task, in which it could never be possible to attain more than a relative amount of success, was increased by the fact that the books to be written were intended not for Christians with years of Christian thought and instruction to soften apparent inconsistencies, nor for men trained in the art of so softening the intellectual paradoxes of life as to escape from mental paralysis, but for the average member of the Christian congregation, simple-minded and matter-of-fact, to whom the narrative of the Lord's life with its double-sidedness would repeatedly suggest hard questions, until use and custom blunted their edge. How could the Lord, if He was divine, ask for information? How could He wish or will things that did not happen? How could it be said that He could not do this or that? Did God really forsake Him in the garden? Could it be that He had prayed a prayer which was unfulfilled? Was it possible that Peter had rebuked Him? Why was He baptized if baptism implied repentance and forgiveness of sin? The first and third Gospels prove themselves to be later than the second by the consideration which they show for the simple-minded reader in questions like this, and it is quite possible that Mk., Mt., and Lk. may often have agreed in a quite independent revision of Mk. in these respects." [7]

But it is one thing to establish a relationship between the framework of Mt. and that of Mk.; it is quite another to say that Mt. modifies accounts given in Mk., corrects his statements, and softens away impressions which might be derived from a perusal of the second Gospel.

The main lines of proof that Mt. has so treated Mk. may be summarily stated as follows:—(we give, where possible, Mr. Allen's own words, making use, however, of italics for the sake of convenience.)

[7] P. xxxviii.

1. Mt. **abbreviates** the narratives in Mk.[8]
   a. he removes his redundant expressions.
   b. he drops out details.
   c. 'sayings' are omitted from the discourses.
   d. a whole section is sometimes abbreviated.
2. Mt. **amplifies** some of the narrative sections.[9]
3. Mt. makes a number of changes in the peculiar **linguistic** details of the second Gospel.
   a. he omits or changes Mk's characteristic words.
   b. he changes his historic presents into aorists.
   c. he avoids Mk's use of ἤρξατο with an infinitive.[10]
   d. also his use of εἶναι with a participle.
   e. he changes Mk's Active and Middle verbs into Passives.
   f. he omits his redundant words, *e. g.*, his double negatives and compound verbs.
   g. he corrects the harshness of Mk's syntax, especially in the use of adverbs and prepositions.[11]
4. "More important, however, than changes in language, are alterations which seem due to increasing feelings of **reverence for the person of Christ.** The second Evangelist had not scrupled to attribute to Him human emotion, and to describe Him as asking questions. Such statements are almost uniformly omitted by the editor of this Gospel."[12]
5. "Due to the same causes are, without doubt, changes made in regard to the **miracles.**"[13]
6. "In view of the facts recorded above, it may perhaps be not too fanciful to see a striving after a **reverential** attitude in the following changes"[14]—and a series of minute differences between the two Gospels are brought forward.
7. "Side by side with these changes in expression dealing

[8] P. xvii.
[9] P. xix.
[10] P. xxii.
[11] P. xxvii.
[12] P. xxxi.
[13] P. xxxii.
[14] P. xxxiii.

with the person of the Lord runs a series of somewhat similar alterations in favor of the **disciples.**" [15]

8. Changes or insertions are made in order to **qualify a statement** of the second Evangelist.[16]
9. Certain changes are also made for the sake of greater **accuracy.**[17]
10. Lastly, come certain noticeable changes in **point of fact.**[18]

We have given the above scheme of proof in full so that our readers may see at a glance the nature of the argument. It is clear that if this series of statements is capable of anything approaching proof we shall have to throw away as useless encumbrances many ideas which we have hitherto held regarding the composition of the Gospels. And this, needless to say, we should be prepared to do were proof forthcoming.

But is proof forthcoming?

The argument, to repeat, runs thus:— Mt. has absorbed Mk.; an examination of the two Gospels shows this—so it is claimed—incontestably. A further examination shows the principles which have guided him in his treatment of the material thus taken over. It is with the results of this further examination that we quarrel and with the principles on which it is conducted. For we are asked to believe this modification of Mk. by Mt. because some such explanation is necessitated on the hypothesis that Mt. has absorbed Mk. But the very startling view of Mt's procedure must make us pause before accepting the hypothesis unconditionally.

It will be noticed that the arguments given above fall into two distinct classes: (*a*) the purely literary, viz., nos. 1-3; and (*b*) those which indicate a distinct moral or dogmatic tendency on the part of Mt., viz., nos. 4-10.

Now, while we could imagine such literary changes being made by Mt. in the process of adapting Mk., we instinctively shrink from the view that Mt. has been led by dogmatic or moral possessions to change his 'source.' The point with which

[15] *Ibid.*
[16] P. xxxiv.
[17] P. xxxv.
[18] *Ibid.*

we are concerned here is not whether such modifications could have taken place, but whether the grounds for asserting that they have been practised are really convincing.

Let us examine first of all some of the arguments brought forward in favor of literary changes.

1. Mt. abbreviates Mk's record by the **removal of redundant expressions.** We are referred, among other places, to

(*a*) Mk. IV. 1, "And all the multitude were by the sea on the land"; Mt. puts this much more briefly: "and all the multitude stood upon the beach," XIII, 2.

(*b*) Mk. VI. 35, "And when the day was now far spent, His disciples came unto Him and said, The place is desert and the day is now far spent." Mt. XIV. 15, has "And when even was come, the disciples came to Him, saying, The place is desert, and the time is already past"; he is therefore said to avoid Mk's repetition of the words 'far spent.'

(*c*) Mk. XIV. 3, "a woman having an alabaster cruse of ointment of spikenard very costly— *μύρου νάρδου πιετικῆς*." Mt. XXVI. 7, "an alabaster cruse of exceeding precious ointment *μύρου βαρυτίμου*."

(d) Mk. XV. 32, "that we may see and believe *ἴδωμεν καὶ πιστεύσωμεν*."

Mt. XXVII. 40, omits 'believe'—writing merely "let us see whether Elias cometh to save Him." [19]

Forty-nine examples of such abbreviations are given; we have taken the above instances at random. Do they prove a deliberate revision of Mk. by Mt.? It is hard to believe it. However, it must be conceded that the argument is cumulative, and before condemning we must analyze some of the other instances brought forward.

2. Mt. abbreviates Mk. by **dropping out details from his narrative.** Seventeen instances are brought forward in support of this assertion; Mt. omits the following:—

[19] P. XXIV.

Mk. I. 13, "He was with the wild beasts."
I. 20, "with the hired servants."
I. 29, "with James and John."
III. 17, "Boanerges."
IV. 17, "upon the cushion."
VI. 39-40, "by companies . . . . green . . . . in ranks, by hundreds and by fifties."
IX. 3, "so as no fuller on earth can whiten."
XIV. 51,—the young man who fled naked.
XV. 21, "the father of Alexander and Rufus."

To these should be added the eight statements in Mk. relative to the immense numbers who flocked round Our Lord and caused great inconvenience to the disciples; cf. I. 33, I. 45, II. 2, 4, III. 9, 10, 20, VI. 31; all these Mt. omits.[20]

But it will be evident that we have here, especially in the nine last-mentioned instances, just those priceless touches which individualize the Second Gospel and are proofs of its 'eye-witness character'; they show us the impress of S. Peter who saw the events as they happened; it is noteworthy that in five of these instances, viz., those referred to in I. 20, 29, IV. 38, VI. 39-40, and in IX. 3 (not included in the above), S. Peter himself was undoubtedly present and, in some cases, a particularly interested spectator.

But upon what possible view of S. Matthew's aim in absorbing the Second Gospel into his own can we explain such omissions as the above? We are talking, of course, only of the literary changes just given. It will be allowed that the clauses wanting in Mt. are precisely those which give life to the Second Gospel. To them is due its peculiarly vivid character and they go far towards proving or rather confirming the tradition that S. Mark, 'interpres Petri,' actually took down his Gospel as Peter preached it. But if this tradition is well founded, the hypothetical editor of Mk. *i. e.*, the author of our First Gospel, would probably have known it and would almost certainly not have tampered with it. Neither should

[20] P. xvii.

we forget that S. Luke has just the same omissions, *i. e.*, he seems oblivious of just precisely the same striking features of Mk's narrative which, in common with Mt., he has omitted. Can this mean that both Mt. and Lk., as Mr. Allen seems indeed to suggest, agree in a series of most extraordinary 'omissions' of all that was most life-like in the 'source' they had before them?

But to continue with our examination of the 'proofs':—

3. Mt. abbreviates Mk. by **omitting 'sayings' from the discourses.**[21]

It is evident that, since Mt. and Mk. are so much alike, a very large series of instances would have to be examined in order to establish such a conclusion. As a matter of fact only nine are brought forward. The argument is that when Mt. and Mk. have the same context and contents, Mt. frequently omits 'sayings' *which he has already given;* thus, for example:—

(*a*) Mt. XIII. 23-24, omits Mk. v. 15, the quasi-parable of the 'candle,' because already given in v. 15.

(*b*) Mt. XIII. 23-24, omits Mk. IV. 22,—the words '*nothing hidden which shall not be made manifest*,' because already given in Mt. x. 28.

(*c*) Mt. XVIII. 5, omits Mk. IX. 36,—'*And whosoever receiveth Me, receiveth not Me but Him that sent Me*,' because already given in Mt. x. 40.

(*d*) Mt. XVIII. 5, omits Mk. IX. 41; the words about a cup of water, &c.

It would take us beyond our limits were we to examine each of these passages but we fancy that anyone who will be at the pains to do so for himself will feel convinced that the view that Mt. has omitted these 'sayings' because he gives them elsewhere is well-nigh inconceivable. It is too artificial by far. If Mt. could do it he could have written the whole of his Gospel without the assistance of Mk's framework.

[21] P. xviii. c.

But a far more serious objection to the theory lies in this that the argument can only hold good if it can be shown that this is Mt's usual procedure. Yet it can easily be shown that the reverse is the case and that Mt. has repeatedly preserved 'sayings' occurring in the same context in Mk. *and yet also given by Mt. elsewhere.* Thus cp. the 'sayings' about Beelzebub in Mt. XII. 22, = Mk. III. 22, and also occurring in Mt. IX. 32. Another notable instance is found in Mt. XVIII. 8-9, = Mk. IX. 43-48, yet already given, though in inverse order, by Mt. V. 29-30. See also Mt. V. 32, = XIX. 9, and Mk. X. 11-12; Mt. VI. 14, = XVIII. 35, and Mk. XI. 25; especially see Mt. XVI. 12, = XI. 14, and Mk. IX. 13.

We may pass over the next two sections, viz., the assertions that Mt. has now abbreviated, now amplified, whole sections of Mk. It is very hard indeed to conceive that Mt. has deliberately pared down, for example, Mk's vivid account of the cure of the 'Lunatic Boy,' cp. Mk. IX. 14-29, and Mt. XVII. 14-20; Mk. is so vivid, his details are so full of interest, that it is well-nigh incredible that if Mt. had this narrative before him in the form in which it is presented in Mk. he should not have preserved it for us intact. If Mt. gives it as he found it in his 'source', *i. e.*, in a non-Marcan 'source,' then his account is meagre but sufficient; if, on the other hand, he extracted it from Mk., then he has emasculated it and his account must be set down as bald in the extreme. The same must be said of the accounts of the murder of S. John the Baptist in Mt. xiv. 1-12, and in Mk. vi. 14-29.

4. Mt. has made certain **linguistic** changes in the material he has taken over from Mk.

(*a*) Mt. omits or changes Mk's **characteristic words,** *εὐθύς*, for example.[22]

(*b*) he avoids Mk's use of *ἤρξατο* with the infinitive.[23]

(*c*) he changes Mk's **historic presents** into aorists.[24]

(*d*) he avoids Mk's use of *εἶναι* with a participle.[25]

[22] P. xix.
[23] P. xxi.
[24] P. xx.
[25] xxii.

(*e*) he changes Mk's **Active and Middle** verbs into **passives.**[26]
(*f*) he omits Mk's **double negatives.**[27]
(*g*) he corrects Mk's **syntax,** especially in the use of adverbs and prepositions.[28]

In critical investigations all *a priori* notions have to be rigorously set aside, but even when we have laid all bias on one side it is hard not to ejaculate at this point, What an artificial Gospel Matthew's must be!

We will only examine one of these 'proofs' of consistent linguistic changes wrought by Mt.

> "Sir John Cæsar Hawkins[29] (*Hor. Synopticae,* pp. 114 ff. in Dst. ed., pp. 143 ff. in 2nd ed., 1909) reckons 151 **historic presents** in Mk., of which Mt. retains only 21. Mt. has about 93 such presents, 21 of them being from Mk. About 66 are cases of λέγει or λέγουσιν, about 11 of them being from Mk. Nine of the historic presents retained from Mk. occur in Mk. xiv. 27-41 = Mt. xxvi. 31-45. It seems clear, therefore, that Mt. generally avoided the historic present when reproducing Mk., and some of the 21 cases where he retains it may be due to assimilation. In reproducing other sources he seems also to have avoided the present, except in the case of λέγει and λέγουσιν. The small number of other exceptions occur in parables (but in the nature of things the Logia would not have many such presents), and in chs. ii-iv. 11, the presence of some nine presents not including λέγει, in this section is very curious, and would be naturally explained by the theory that this section was drawn from a source in which such presents were a marked feature, if there were sufficient corroborative evidence."

And further on we find:—

> "The editor of the Gospel shows a distinct tendency to

[26] P. xxiii.
[27] P. xxv.
[28] P. xxvii.
[29] P. xx.

remove historic presents from a source before him. In Mk. there are 151 such tenses. Of these, 72 are cases of λέγει or λέγουσιν. Of the remaining 79 the editor of the first Gospel omits or alters 69, retaining only 10. Yet in III. 1-47, IV. 17, there are 7 such tenses, viz., III. 1, 13, 15, IV. 5, 8 (bis), 11. This would be explicable if the editor were following a source of which the use of the historic present was a marked feature." [30]

Yet it seems to us that the data furnished would, on examination, point to another conclusion:—

a. As Mt. has, when all allowances have been made, 93 acknowledged historic presents, it is not easy to see how he can be said to avoid those of Mk.

b. It is conceded that he *has* retained 21 from Mk.

c. It would be wrong to conclude from the above statement that the remaining 139 historic presents of Mk. have all of them been avoided or omitted by Mt., for it is manifestly not the case that Mt. has in all these instances anything parallel to Mk.

d. It is conceded that there exist in Mt. two sections parallel to Mk. in which Mt. has retained an extraordinary percentage of historic presents found in the Marcan parallel; thus in Mt. XXVI. 31-45, we find 9 without counting λέγει; similarly in Mt. XXVI. 31-45, there are 9 more. And it should be noted that in this latter section Mt. has one example which does not occur in the corresponding section of Mk., though it is true that it is only a case of λέγει and that Mt. does use this particular present frequently.

e. The concluding words of the above-quoted statement are certainly remarkable: "The presence of some 9 presents not including λέγει in this section (viz., Mt. II-IV. 11, to which we must add the 9 from Mt. XXVI. 31-45) is very curious, and would naturally be explained by the

[30] P. lx.

theory that this section was drawn from a source in which such presents were a marked feature, if there were sufficient corroborative evidence."

It is hard to understand what is meant; for the Second Gospel, the supposed source, is characterized by precisely such presents as the whole argument is intended to show. Would not the more logical conclusion be that in these two sections we have proof of Mt's use of a source remarkably akin to Mk. and that he is faithful to his source and copies it correctly?

But if this is the true conclusion from the facts and it seems impossible to avoid it—what becomes of the hypothesis that our present Mk. is Mt's main source and that he modified it consistently all the way through?

. . . . . .

So far we have dealt with what we have termed the 'literary' modifications of Mk. by Mt.; we now pass to the consideration of those modifications said to be due to 'dogmatic or moral prepossessions' viz., nos. 4-10 supra.

(*a*) "More important, however, than changes in language, are alterations which seem due to an increasing feeling of **reverence for the person of Christ.** The second Evangelist had not scrupled to attribute to Him human emotion, and to describe Him as asking questions. Such statements are almost uniformly omitted by the editor of this Gospel." [31]

Nine instances are given:—

1. Mk. III. 5, 'And when He had looked round about on them with anger, being grieved' is omitted from Mt. XII. 13. Cp. "the way in which Mt. XII. 49, avoids *περιβλεψάμενος* of Mk. III. 34."
2. Mk. X. 21, 'looking upon him loved him' is omitted in Mt.

Apropos of these instances it should be noted that though in XII. 49, Mt. has not got the words 'And looking round on them'

[31] P. xxxi.

he yet has something quite as anthropomorphic, 'And He stretched forth His hand towards His disciples.'

3. Mk. I. 41, 'And being moved with compassion' is omitted in Mt. VIII. 3. It is acknowledged, however, that Mt. uses the very same expression verb, *σπλαγνίζεσθαι*, four times of Christ elsewhere.
4. Mk. I. 43, 'And He strictly charged him *ἐμβριμησάμενος*' is omitted in Mt. VIII. 3.

Yet how untrustworthy such deductions are may be gauged from the fact that in IX. 39, Mt. uses the very same expression in his account of the charge to the two blind men. We need not examine the other instances; an unbiassed scrutiny of those given above will perhaps show that in these so-called 'anthropomorphisms' which Mt. is said to reject or avoid we only have an additional indication of the 'eye-witness character of the Second Gospel.' And it should be noted, too, that if Mt. had been really so anxious to avoid undue emphasis of the human aspect of Christ he should surely not have written his account of the Temptation, IV. 1-12, where see especially ver. 2, 'He afterwards *hungered*,' cp. XXI. 18; neither should we expect to find in his Gospel such passages as VIII. 10, where Christ is depicted as *marvelling;* nor XXVI. 37-38, where we are told that 'He began to be *sorrowful and sore troubled*.'

(*b*) "Side by side with these changes in expression dealing with the person of the Lord runs a series of somewhat similar **alterations in favour of the disciples.**"[32]

Fourteen instances are given; we will content ourselves with giving a few of them in extenso and will, for convenience sake, arrange the parallel narratives in double columns.

(*a*) Mk. VIII. 17, 'Have ye your heart hardened? Having eyes, see ye not? and having ears, hear ye not?' is omitted in Mt. XVI. 9 and in ver. 12 a statement is inserted to the effect that the disciples did understand.

In order to estimate this statement at its true worth let us put the two passages in parallel columns:

[32] P. xxxiii.

Mt. XVI. 8-12.	*Mk.* VIII. 17-18, 21.
"O ye of little faith, why reason ye among yourselves, because ye have no bread? Do ye not yet understand . . . . ? How is it that ye do not perceive that I spake not to you concerning bread? . . . Then understood they how that He bade them not beware of the leaven of bread, but of the teaching of the Pharisees and Sadducees."	"Why reason ye because ye have no bread? do ye not yet perceive, neither understand? Having eyes see ye not? and having ears, hear ye not? and do ye not remember? When I brake five loaves. . . . ? Do ye not yet understand?"

It must be confessed that it requires considerable ingenuity to see how Mt. tones down this rebuke in favor of the disciples.

Again, we are told to compare:

Mt. VIII. 25-27	and	*Mk.* IV. 38-40.
"And they came to Him and awoke Him, saying, Save, Lord; we perish. And He saith unto them, Why are ye fearful, O ye of little faith? . . . . And the men marvelled. . . . "		"And they awake Him and say unto Him, Master, carest Thou not that we perish? . . . . And He said unto them, Why are ye fearful? have ye not yet faith? And they feared exceedingly. . . ."

The comment made on this is that 'Have ye not yet faith?' becomes 'Ye of little faith' in Mt.

This may be perfectly true, but it is hard to see in this slight change a hint that Mt. tones down harsh expressions given by Mk. as used by Our Lord to the disciples. The argument would only hold good if there were really less of rebuke in Mt's presentation of the incident—which can hardly be maintained.

And once more, if this had been the habitual tone of Mt. he should not have written XXVI. 8-9, where the *disciples murmur* at Mary's act; neither should he, with apparently needless emphasis, have told us how they *slept* in the garden, XXVI. 40-

45; least of all should he have told us that 'all the disciples *leaving Him, fled,*' xxvi. 56.

We may conclude with two general remarks:

(*a*) Mr. Allen calls attention to Mt's peculiar 'closing formula'—"And it came to pass that when Jesus had fully ended these words. . . . " cp. vii. 28, xi. 1, xiii. 53, xix. 1, and xxvi. 1. Mr. Allen remarks that "These . . . . form one of the most striking features of this Gospel." We venture to think that they constitute a feature entirely destructive of his main thesis, namely, that Mt. was dependent on Mk. for his framework. For they certainly belong to Mt's framework, and equally certainly they do not belong to that of Mk. Nay, more: they do not merely belong to Mt's framework, they are that framework. It has even been suggested that we are to see in this formula a vestige of the division of the 'Logia' into Five Books as mentioned by Papias. Whether this view is justified or not it is at least certain that it must give pause to those who hold that Mk. is the frame used by Mt. and therefore are compelled to hold that the latter has, by means of a most minute process of manipulation, adjusted Mk. to his requirements.

(*b*) The Greek of Mt. and Mk. is often identical, cp. for example, Mt. iv. 18-22, and Mk. i. 16-20; Mt. viii. 15-16, and Mk. i. 30-34; Mt. xv. 32-38, and Mk. viii. 2-9; also Mt. viii. 2-4, and Mk. i. 40-45; Mt. xv. 8-9, = Mk. vii. 6-7a, should be especially noted, for the quotation from Isaias there given does not agree with the LXX and yet—allowance always being made for subsequent adaptation—is the same in each Evangelist.

But this fact must not blind us to another fact which is too often disregarded, viz., that though in all these passages the Greek is the same in words, &c., yet the *whole cast* of the sentences is different. If, however, it be true that Mt. has absorbed Mk. we shall have to suppose that in such passages as these, Mt., with the Greek of Mk. before him, recast every sentence he found in the original. Is such a proceeding probable?

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THE SPIRIT OF MEDIEVALISM.

In his lecture on Pre-Raphaelitism delivered at Edinburgh in November, 1853, Ruskin said: "The fact is that modern art is not so much distinguished from old art by greater skill as by a radical change in temper." This change took place "about the time of Raphael, in the spirit of Roman Catholics and Protestants alike; and that change consisted in the denial of their religious belief, at least, in the external and trivial affairs of life, and often in far more serious things." The change is noticeable chiefly in art, which now is not as of old brought into the service of religion. "This is," according to Ruskin, "the great distinction between medieval and modern art; and from that are clearly deducible all the other essential differences between them."

Surprising as was that statement to English hearers, so long accustomed to regard the Middle Ages as a period of unredeemed darkness and superstition, it will hardly be contradicted now by any serious critic, despite contemporary art's more or less affected religious sentiment. But, true though it be, perhaps it does not adequately express the fundamental difference between the medieval and modern temper; it hardly reaches to that ultimate quality of mind which characterizes medievalism from modernism. Because, even supposing that modern art would again become what it was in the days of Fra Angelico, namely the joyous hand-maid of religion, nevertheless it would still remain modern since it would inevitably reflect the mental hue of the modern man, and be fundamentally unlike medieval art,—despite the most skilful imitation in color and draughting and selection of subject. Besides, peoples of various ages and races can profess the same religion and love it as passionately and habitually as even a medieval saint, and yet their expression of it whether in art or politics or devotion will necessarily be differentiated by temperament, by

their way of looking at life, at everything. So that, though the medieval man—be he artist or warrior—differed markedly from us by the intensity and universality of his religious fervor; nevertheless, it seems to me that we must probe deeper than this in order to put our finger upon that more general, more characteristic quality of soul which made him so very different from us in all things that he said and did.

Now one does not need to study those past ages very long before noticing something which by its peculiarity stands unique in the world's history, something which is absolutely absent from contemporary life, and which is present only occasionally in the classic civilization of Greece and Rome. I mean a constant, almost pathetic contradiction between *theories* of life and actual facts, between ideas and deeds, between aspirations and their realizations—in a word, *contrast*. Everything medieval was painted on the canvas of life in decided but contrasting colors. The old Cathedrals—those inimitable marvels of architecture—rise most often out of the dirt and wretchedness of the city slums. Rude soldiers, whose swords were habitually stained with human blood, founded monasteries and churches for the honor of God. Philip the Fair, though a staunch Catholic in faith, hesitates not to perpetrate that shameful outrage at Anagni upon the spiritual head of Christendom. Henry II, Plantagenet, is accessory to the murder of à Becket, but then in penance bares his back to the scourge of a priest. The kings of England as Norman vassals of the kings of France do feudal homage on the eve of warring against them. The Emperors of Germany are the feeblest of sovereigns in fact even when the highest of all earthly rulers in theory. Frederick II, the "wonder of the world," leads a crusade against the very Saracens with whom he fills his court, and cynically mocks in secret at the religion for which he has a superstitious veneration. Francis of Assisi weds his "Lady Poverty" in the astonished face of an age of comparative luxury. Fra Angelico's sweet angels and Giotto's serene tower look down on the blood-feuds of wonderful Florence.

Why was this? The answer will, I venture to say, give us the real clue to the essential spirit of medievalism. Nor is the answer difficult.

I. Idealism.

This constant contrast was due to the *idealism* of the medieval mind. Ruskin came very near this truth when he observed in the above quoted lecture that what differentiates medieval from modern art was *thought*. That is, with the medieval artist thought, the idea to be expressed was foremost; whereas with the modern form, the manner of expression is that upon which he expends most of his labor. Yes! your typical medievalist was above all things an idealist, in fact, a dreamer. Whatever he might have been in fact, however low he might have sunk in the strata of civilization, whatever his vices, nevertheless at all times his ideals were high, his aspirations were sublime, his yearnings spiritual, his theories superbly magnificent, his whole temper of mind fundamentally non-materialistic or lilliputian, but intensely spiritual and ennobled by a stupendous, heroic, Catholic encyclopedism such as is possible only to a magnificent idealist. There then is the word —idealism; there you have the clue that will lead you through the maze of those baffling medieval contradictions. There is that one universal quality of mind which stamps a man as medieval and not modern or classic.

The cause for such a habit of mind lay in the conditions in which men lived. It was an age when even the richest had to put up with hardships which to us of gentle times seem insuperable. Every man's hand was ever at his sword-hilt. War was seldom humanized by such amenities as a Red Cross Society. Travel by land was rendered no less insecure by princely and beggar bandits than it was on sea by the piratical Northman or Saracen. The rich man's castle was hardly as comfortable as the humbler cottage of a modern farmer. Amusements were comparatively rare such as we understand them. Education was largely a clerical distinction. Dread

pestilence habitually stalked through Europe, destroying sometimes a half of the population as it did in England in the fourteenth century. Verily, it was then a struggle for existence, an heroic struggle of mankind to rise up again from out the world-wide ruins of that mighty Roman Empire which had been synonymous with civilization.

To men living under such depressing conditions, battling against such seemingly hopeless odds, *idealism* necessarily became part and parcel of their mental make-up. Because they simply *had to aim high* in order to rise at all. They had to be dreamers, (if you prefer the word), in order to liberate themselves from the dead weight of crass materialism weighing upon their spirits, benumbing their courage, fighting them at every cross-road of progress. Had they not been dreamers, that is, had they not been firm believers in the possibility of their accomplishing great things they would not have accomplished but a fraction of what they actually did; they would perhaps have given up the struggle in despair and lapsed farther and farther into the semi-savagery of their impenetrable German forests or wind-swept sand-dunes of the North Sea.

Moreover they were young races—peoples in the first flush of rejuvenation when blood ran red and strong through their veins, and they dreamed, as all the young dream, of ideals to be accomplished. The old classic "taedium vitae" was gone like a poison out of the system. The very hardships of life were tempering the new Teutonic steel and refurbishing the ancient Latin element. Mankind was young again and once more dreamed those blessed visions, felt the tingle of those iridescent ideals which must ever be the driving power behind and in every great work. Were I given my choice to live in any one particular age it seems to me now that it must have been sweet indeed to have been present in the plaza in front of the Cathedral of Clermont when Pope Urban delivered in the eloquent Provençal tongue perhaps the most effective address to which the world has ever listened—his appeal to Christendom for the First Crusade. How must the quick blood of those Franks have leaped at his opening words as given

by Robert the Monk: "Oh! race of Franks, race from across the mountains, race chosen and beloved by God, set apart from all nations!" Words, too, falling from the lips of the revered head of all Christendom! No wonder the arm-clad multitude of Franks—the main strength of the Crusading spirit—felt this compliment run through their ranks like a living fire and responded with that supreme cry of idealism, "God wills it." The whole scene brings before us the fresh youthfulness and immature daring and heedless almost reckless enthusiasm of a race still young, still uninfected by the halting, calculating, paralyzing doubts and fears of a maturer age. Over by the Golden Gate and the Orontes and in the silence of the Arabian and Egyptian deserts that Christian battle-cry was answered by a no less ideal even if fanatic challenge, "God is God and Mahomet is His Prophet." Both represent idealism carried to an intensity hitherto and since never equalled in the world's history. And whatever the critical student may now think of the wisdom of this tremendous clash of two different civilizations, he must be material indeed, if he cannot at even these latter days of crass commercialism feel a thrill of that wonderful idealism which produced that conflict, and envy the youthfulness of an age which could be so ideal.

These two causes more than any others were responsible for that typical characteristic of medievalism. Now observe how this idealism colored every act of those times.

a. In Religion.

Naturally, we should expect to note it foremost from the religious side, considering with Ruskin how habitually the medieval man was religious in temperament and views of life. Even a modern non-Catholic will, I doubt not, concede that Catholicity in the Middle Ages was an ideal even if (to his way of thinking) an erroneous conception of the due relations between God and man. For surely what more ideal could that conception be than that of a universal faith binding all, noble and serf, Frank and Saxon and Dane and all other races

into one gigantic system, presided over by the heir of the Ancient Imperial Rome and the first of the Apostles, before whose white throne all men were at least theoretically equal from the Hohenstaufen and the Capetian and the Plantagenet down to the cotter and the jongleur? By the side of such a magnificent conception of religion our modern hopeless division into warring sects seems no less ridiculous than saddening. So, too, the practical expression of that encyclopedic faith was no less ideal at times, even Quixotic. Take in instance that most ideal of men, that "Sir Galahad" among the Saints, that "Troubadour" among the Monks, that "Patron-Saint of Democracy," that unsullied spouse of the "Lady Poverty"—the sweet Francis of Assisi. Point out if you can any figure in all history which was so essentially ideal, who by his life and words ever contradicted so flatly, so uncompromisingly the spirit of worldliness or materialism! Or take the Crusaders themselves—with all the princely political intrigue and Venetian selfishness only too often permeating them—what were they, what *could* they have been in the hearts of the rank and file but the military expression of the religious idealism of martial races? They are inexplicable on any other grounds: easily intelligible on this.

b. In Politics.

When we enter the region of politics the same idealism meets us even there precisely where we least expect it, so disheartened are we by the shameful banality of our own politics. Not that even the Middle Ages did not have their "graft" and all other incidents of a low state of political morals. The contrary is only too vividly illustrated by the careers of a Philip the Fair, a John Lackland, above all by that of the arch-priest of heartless, shameless politics, Nicolo Machiavelli,—and all the miserable crowd of "quattrocentisti," if such "moderns" *can* be classed as medieval. But I do say that with all its failings medieval politics was ennobled in some ways by an idealism to which modern politics can lay no

claim. And in proof note that political conception which crowned medieval politics with a real glory, even though it had little practical effect upon everyday politics outside of Germany and Italy—I mean the theory of the Holy Roman Empire, that strange, hopeless medieval dream.

It is difficult for us of these days of almost universal civilization to understand the feelings of dismay which filled the old world when it heard the horrifying news of the fall of Rome. Lactantius had said that "When Rome, the head of the world, shall have fallen, who can doubt that the end is come, of all things, aye, of the earth itself." So it literally seemed to many according as horde after horde of Goths and Vandals poured across the Rhine and the Danube, destroying for some two centuries that ancient civilization, until the dark cloud of feudalistic anarchy settled down. Cæsar falling dead at the base of Pompey's statue caused less a shudder than the fall of the eternal city before Odoacer's warriors. It was so terrible that after a while its awfulness terrified the invaders themselves. Ataulf, the Visigoth, dreamed of the glory of "renewing and maintaining by Gothic strength the fame of Rome," desiring to go down to posterity as the "restorer of that Roman power which it was beyond my power to replace." The idea outlived the actual empire. It persisted in men's imaginations and hopes until it gradually revives again in the person of the Great Charles and still more so in the person of that imperial dreamer, Otho the Great. I say the *idea* persisted, because it was never much more than an idea, a theory, at least outside of Germany where it eventually involved in disaster the great house of the Hohenstaufens, and of Italy where it involved in a temporary ruin of its political prestige the very Papacy which had renewed its life. That it was a failure, a necessary failure, in many ways, few will deny. Henry standing at the gates of Canossa, Boniface lying half dead in his palace at Anagni some two centuries or more later are the alpha and omega of that world-wide duel between Pope and Emperor which testifies to the inherent impossibility of realizing such a magnificent ideal. It as well

testifies unmistakably to that inherent characteristic of the medieval mind which grasped at theories amidst the crudest of facts, and sincerely believed in a theory with an almost pathetic persistence long after experience had proved the hopelessness of its realization. Here, indeed, was idealism in politics carried to an extreme whose very audacity and simple-minded trust is one of the most amazing things in the world's history. Beside it the imperial dreams of Alexander or "Greater England" seem comparatively petty, because in none other political scheme was the driving idea so stupendous, so encyclopedic, in none was or is the practical realization so pathetically in contrast with the theoretical ideal. It stands unique among mankind's rare acts of political idealism.

c. In Industry.

Surprising as it is to note this in politics, far more astounding is it to see the same persistent idealism in that department of life which is of all others by its nature the most likely to be animated by materialistic principles—namely—the industrial. Yet even this received a tinge of that same spiritual color which beautified religion and politics.

With us labor is labor: work is work; work which we engage in from necessity though we hate it; dull work in which there is no enthusiasm or love except that springing from the desire of payment. But your medieval craftsman carried to his work a broad, generous, Catholic spirituality until his work often became synonymous with his religion and his art, so that at times it became difficult to say which was foremost in the order of ideas leading up to a given production—the artisan, the artist or the saint. The gild for instance which was the unit, the foundation of the entire industrial system, was it not always a *religious* association? A standing proof that even a labor organization could not become purely material. And those marvellous Cathedrals whether at Westminster or Cologne or Milan or Strasburg, what are they but expressions in stone of a mysticism, an idealism which alone made them possible of construction under what would now be considered insuper-

able obstacles! Steam and electricity—those two great mechanical forces at our command—were unknown to them. Yet year after year, century after century these artisans patiently worked away whether as individuals or as members of a gild, careless of whether or no posterity heard of even their names, satisfied with the proud consciousness that their labor was a labor of love in the service of a sublime religious ideal done under the all-seeing eye of the Master Architect of the world. No wonder then, that these Cathedrals rose from amidst the slums and the market-places and din of the daily toil. That was precisely where they should logically have been built, because they were the expressions in stone of the idealism which spiritualized the every-day toil and threw around labor a joyous, serene beauty it has never since felt.

d. In Art.

Of the idealism of medieval art little need be said. That is almost a threadbare subject. Every modern sentimentalist knows how to rave over the angels of Fra Angelico and the wistful Madonnas of Botticelli, and can tell you glibly of how this sweet spirit of art passed away with the Middle Ages to be replaced by the classicism of Raphael's degenerate imitators, to be partially revived again some sixty years ago by the English Pre-Raphaelites—Rosetti, Burne-Jones, Madox Browne, Millais, and others. But how many of these more or less sincere devotees of medieval art believe in or can realize the marvellous mysticism and idealism of the race which gave birth to such painters? J. A. Symonds thus expresses the thought: "The April freshness of Giotto, the piety of Fra Angelico, the virginal purity of the young Raphael, the sweet gravity of John Bellini, the philosophic depth of Da Vinci, the sublime elevation of Michael Angelo, the suavity of Fra Bartolommeo, the delicacy of Della Robbia, the restrained fervor of Rosellini, the rapture of the Siennese and the reverence of the Umbrian masters, Francia's pathos, Mantegna's dignity and Luini's divine simplicity were qualities

which belonged not only to these artists but also to the people of Italy from whom they sprang." True! He is speaking of a period when medievalism was somewhat on the wane but his words apply literally to every other artistic expression of life in all medieval times. Because medieval art of any period was part of and knit inseparably with life, not separated from life as is modern art. Ruskin calls attention to this "historic" quality of medieval art, when he notes how these painters preferred to portray not past events but "acts of their own days," to paint not imaginary portraits of past celebrities like Cæsar or Pericles or Alexander, but likenesses of their contemporaries —Can Grande, Dante, Leo X, St. Francis. Nor did it shock their artistic sense of harmony to place the living in even imaginary paintings clothed in the customary dress of the day. Art was so familiar to them in every act, at every turn, not merely in grand Cathedrals but in their very sleeping apartments; the artists themselves were so often of the common people that art and life became one. Or rather art was rendered sane, truthful, sincere by the realities of life, and life was beautified, spiritualized, idealized habitually by the infusion of art, of beauty.

The medieval man was therefore fundamentally an idealist whether with Godfrey at the Crusade, or with Hildebrand at Canossa, or with the artisan carving a gargoyle on a cathedral, or with the gildsman at his factory, or with Giotto working on his tower, or with Angelico in his quiet cell at St. Mark's. This is the secret of that curious, persistent contrast between his heroic virtues and his terrifying vices, between his theories and their practical failures. This is what marks him off clearly from both the classic Greek and Roman and the modern man.

II. Mental Sanity.

But even his idealism was different from ours. With us unfortunately much passes for idealism which is either mere artistic sentimentality or unhealthy introspection or Puritan fanaticism. Somehow we—I mean Americans above all—do

not seem to possess the saving gift of sanity so essential towards restraining idealism within its proper limits. Perhaps in lieu of a better explanation this may be due to our over-specialization which blinds us to the "perspective" of things. Mr. Edward Howard Griggs in his University Extension Lecture on "The Cities of Italy" suggests indirectly this observation: "Of all men of the period Leonardo (da Vinci) is the culminating example of this myriad-mindedness." He is speaking of certain Renaissance types. "The greatness of these men was not an *exaggerated or over-cultivated talent;* but an essential greatness of spirit, a fundamental creative power that showed itself readily in any channel to which they turned their energies. Our system of specialization is measured upon the abilities of small and uninspired men. . . . If our educational system is to serve the highest life we must seek to awaken the creative spirit from within instead of fashioning a narrow talent or multiplying an *unrelated erudition.*" (The italics are mine.)

No one surely would deny that we have idealism, a real yearning for the spiritual despite our commercialism. But it seems to go to our heads like strong wine and lead us often to ridiculous extremes. The Puritan was an idealist after his fashion. So is the present-day Prohibitionist or Christian Scientist or Doweyite. But it was and is idealism unbalanced, un-related to the other facts of life. Because we have lost that sense of harmony springing from that spirit of encyclopedism typical of mentality not only in Da Vinci's age but throughout every medieval century.

The critic above quoted misses this cause. In the same lecture he says that "the sense of proportion was utterly lost in the Middle Ages," that peculiar mental balance so characteristic (in his view) of classic Greek Life. This seems an unjust criticism. For, to my mind, medieval life really had such a sense to a greater extent than even the Greeks. The latter indeed, had it in some directions perfected. Upon what more absolute calm and harmonious proportion has the human eye ever rested than upon the façade of the Parthenon? But this

sense stopped at art. Greek life in its other more serious phases, for instance, in its views upon women, slaves, religion—in these it was fundamentally one-sided, doubting, disproportionate, not at mental rest.

But medieval life with all its striking contrasts of lord and serf, Cathedral and hovel, even in the bizarre costumes of the people; despite all this it *was* harmonious in all directions because of its encyclopedism, its catholicity. Because in its system of thought all men and all things had their due place from the Emperor and Pope down to the serf and priest, even down to the very brute creation. The rights and duties of each were carefully regulated by their relations to all others. Nothing was left neglected in this vast spiritual Empire, nothing was left unsolved, nothing regarded as in Greek life as useless or unimportant. The modern age may and does consider many of these relations unjustifiable by experience. But the fact remains that, whether correct or incorrect, those medieval men *did see things in perspective* and arranged them in a marvellous even if theoretical harmony. And therefore, no one idea excelled to the exclusion of the attention due the rest. And no one idea became exaggerated and consequently "unhealthy."

So its idealism, vast and intense though it was, nevertheless remained sane, avoiding sentimentality, fanaticism, morbidness, or that peculiarly modern vice—diseased introspection. This is what can be termed the second fundamental quality of medieval thought-sanity, a consideration of which in its effects upon the various phases of life will bring us about as near to an intelligent appreciation of the spirit of the Middle Ages as we can hope to reach concerning ages so distant and different from our own.

a. In Religion.

There are five infallible tests of the mental health of any man, any age; namely, his attitude towards religion, philosophy, morality, art and nature. Because if there be any weakness at all in a given character, it is sure to manifest itself in one

of these directions, however hard-headed and cool and self-collected a man may be in all other ways.

Take first religion. Daily experience as well as past history proves that in no other department of life is mankind as a whole cursed with such an unlimited capacity for making a fool of himself as when he is in the presence of the mysterious questionings of the soul regarding the next life; and that if he avoids this extreme he is endowed with a correspondingly great aptitude for lapsing into the opposite extreme of total neglect. Seldom is he able to steer a middle course and keep his religion in harmonious sympathy with the other relations of life. Nor do I think the future historian will be able to detect any great success on our part. Rather will he observe that one of the characteristics of present life will have been its apparent religious helplessness. For verily we have in this direction lost all sense of harmony. We alternate perpetually between cynical indifference and downright fanaticism. Nominally Christians we follow in practical life principles which are thoroughly pagan. We have accomplished that extraordinary feat hitherto unknown in the world's history, of utterly dissociating religion from public life and largely from private morals. Faith and reason we regard as radically opposed. And in consequence of the soul of man being thus spiritually starved he turns in his hunger to the husks of every wild religious tenet which his troubled brain can excogitate. In a word, the religious man, taken pretty generally, is in a state of religious chaos, bewilderment. An utter absence of harmony and of rest characterizes his religious life.

How different when we turn back almost with a sigh to the Middle Ages. Whether you be Catholic or Protestant you cannot fail to note the calm, the rest, the sweet confidence, above all the easy harmony existing between religion and life. True, there were then discordant notes which the orthodox stamped as heresies. The Albigensian, Waldensian, Bogomile, Arnold of Brescia, Giordano Bruno, the Fraticelli and others had their day and disturbed men's souls for a time. But all in all it was an era of universal and deep religious peace, some-

thing for which it would seem any one might sigh, whatever his religious opinions. Above all there was that peculiar *harmony* between religion and life. What Ruskin says of medieval art being religious applies to everything medieval. A man of Dante's age was religious at all times. When he entered his Gild-Hall or traded at the "fairs," or went a-crusading or frescoed a convent he carried his great "faith" with him. He sinned, of course, did not always live up to that faith, but it walked ever with him and colored his thoughts on week-days no less than on Sundays. Moreover, it fell in easily, harmoniously, as if it were as natural as trading or painting or fighting.

For that reason it was seldom unbalanced. Even the monk shut off from the world did not lose his "perspective." Various and bizzare as were some of the superstitions of those curious days, I am confident that never in the Middle Ages could possibly have been tolerated among at least educated people such a philosophico-religious excrescence as the modern Christian Science. No! all ages have their superstitions and Godfrey and Richard Cœur de Lion had theirs. But humanity had to wait for this latter day of enlightenment to give birth to that and other such unspeakable contradictions of reason. Medieval superstitions at least had some philosophic foundation, some dignity, even at times some historic grandeur, some artistic beauty. Romance has grown its ivy around the tragic ruins of the Albigensian heresy on the field of Muret. There is a Wagnerian grandeur in the Hussite Wars. The crude justice of Ordeals by water and fire were ennobled by a sublime faith however distorted. But it remained for this age of reason, of Erastianism, to produce religious absurdities unadorned by romance or historic tragedy or philosophic apparel or religious fervor or even common-sense. Even in their superstitions the Middle Ages retained a certain saving sense of sanity.

b. In Philosophy.

Of their philosophy the same is to be said in spite of a feeling

of hopelessness at trying to say anything good about scholastic philosophy in an age accustomed to look upon it as barren logic. But whether you be a disciple of Spencer or Darwin or Hegel or just a pure empiricist, you will admit that Scholasticism in its hey-day, in the times of Aquinas and Bonaventure and Albertus Magnus and Roger Bacon was at least "sane." At least these truly great men kept their metaphysics cooled or rather warmed by the infusion of a more practical philosophy based upon human experience. In which connection let me quote a significant remark of Professor Fisher concerning Scholasticism.

"Mysticism and Scholasticism were not antagonistic. Among the theological leaders, the great mystics were Scholastics, and the most eminent Schoolmen, who are not classified with the Mystics exemplified mysticism in their own experience and found a place for it in their teaching. But in certain of the Schoolmen Mysticism is elaborately explained and wrought into an articulated system. Such are the "Victorines," Hugo and Richard. Such is Bonaventura." (*History of Christian Doctrine*, p. 230.)

Medieval philosophy like politics and religion sought to classify *all* thought. Aquinas, the chief of Scholastics, is the friend of Bonaventura, the greatest of Mystics. Albert the Great, master of Aquinas, was at once a practical scientist, an Aristotelian Realist and somewhat of a Platonist. With these wonderfully broad minds all philosophies had their respective merit and attention. However strongly they all clung to the Scholastic method, they were not slaves to any one order of ideas. And their philosophy with all its limitations possessed in consequence a breadth, a dignified sanity, a calm reasonableness, an unruffled majesty to which no other subsequent system of thought has so far even approached. With us philosophy, with all its brilliancy and really great advances in some directions, nevertheless impresses the general public as more or less erratic, likely to run into any extreme, whether of Hegelian idealism or the Positivism of Comte along with the intermediate Cartesianism, the scepticism of Hume, the mysticism of Swedenborg and

so on ad infinitum. It is out of touch with life at least on its practical side. And no modern thinker, not even the most pretentious of them all, Herbert Spencer, possesses that fine sense of harmony or healthy composure so characteristic of Aquinas.

c. In Art.

In the domain of art the lack of harmony is painfully evident. I mean its dissociation from life. To the average man art is held to be a mere luxury chiefly of the rich, the vehicle for the expression of what strikes him as more or less sentimentality or else of downright sensualism. To him an artist is "queer," a sort of helpless dreamer of dreams. Such a man will hardly believe you if you tell him, as Ruskin would have you do, that art should go hand in hand with life, should express life in its most serious as well as light phases, should be the instrument for expressing the deepest emotions; that above all it should be a potent influence in ennobling, beautifying and teaching and strengthening that life. Your efforts are likely as not to be rewarded with a smile of something very akin to pity.

But it was not so before Raphael's day. This great function of art was universally recognized by the poor as well as the rich. Art and life then indeed walked together and the artist was held in as high esteem as the man of affairs. And because of this that art avoided becoming sensual or sentimental—maintaining even a golden mien or serious dignity even when most sportive. Run down the long list from Cimabue and Giotto, the pioneers, on through the intermediate Fra Angelico, Perugino, Botticelli down to the perfected masters Michael Angelo, Da Vinci, Raphael. In all of them there is a seriousness of purpose, a quiet dignity as of men who believed that art did not exist for art's sake, but for life's sake; who worked joyously as men who felt convinced they were doing a noble work and did it well. Only when this sad modern world once again realizes this high mission of art will it produce equally great art; will the "people" again take into their daily life the

inspiration and gentle teachings of beauty as they did when they watched Giotto laboring on his tower or Botticelli in his shop.

d. In Morals.

A fourth general test of a man's sanity is his attitude towards virtue and vice. Judged by this standard modern life presents here also the same persistent lack of balance. That we of to-day are as virtuous or more so than a man of the time of either Godfrey de Bouillon or Lorenzo the Magnificent is not in question. I am speaking rather of the different way in which we look at morality, or to be more correct, at certain vices. And I say we have lost the proper perspective—we have lost sight of that harmony which should exist between grace and nature, between morality or virtue and natural enjoyments. For instance. With us a man swings from the extreme of asceticism to that of sensualism. Take your modern Prohibitionist as a type. In his sincere and commendable efforts at uprooting drunkenness, he goes to the extreme of labelling all drinking as essentially bad; so with some religious sects the ban is put upon many really innocent enjoyments like dancing and card-playing.

Now we find only solitary instances of such Puritanism in the Middle Ages. The Cathari for example. But such sects were sternly frowned upon by public opinion. The Church, so to speak, took part in the fun of her children. The people's holidays were their holydays and vice versa. The church was often their theatre with its mysteries and Miracle Plays. Piety was joyous like the piety of little children. Mankind had to wait for the sombre genius of Calvin to teach them that God was not the loving Father who took pleasure in watching His children at play, but the awful Judge who saved or damned pitilessly, in whose eyes human enjoyments were an abomination. Whatever their faults the Middle Ages were never sad. That is a modern vice, largely the result of our unbalanced piety.

e. In the attitude towards Nature.

A last test remains. Rather an indirect, but I venture to hold none the less sure,—*i. e.*, a man's attitude towards nature. How does nature affect him? It is a commonplace with modern writers that the medieval man was insensible to nature; that he had lost the classic gift of interpreting it; that he did not enjoy nature as we do to-day. A word as to the correctness of these statements.

As mere statements of fact they are false. Your medieval man *did* love nature passionately. The knights going to the tournaments bedecked themselves with flowers; likewise at their banquets. Most of their lives were spent in close contact with nature. They practically lived out of doors. Their pleasures were almost exclusively out-door sports, like hunting and riding. And what more ardent lovers of nature has the world ever seen than Francis of Assisi and Catherine of Siena, who would talk to the field-larks and sit for hours weaving garlands of flowers. Wordsworth himself never loved a flower more passionately.

But the above statements are true in this sense, namely, in so far as they indicate a difference of interpretation of nature. Upon Francis and his contemporaries nature had the same influence as upon children. They loved it for its own sweet sake and romped about it with all the abandon of happy innocent natures. Why? Because they *were* children. They were, as I have already pointed out, yet young peoples to whom the classic disgust of life as well as modern maudlin sentimentality were equally unknown.

But we? How does nature affect us? We are introspective. We love a flower no longer as a child does, but as a mature man with a sort of mild-minded melancholy. The freshness and innocence and beauty of hue and shape are alas! only too often but symbols of our own lost innocence, of departed ideals, shattered hopes, general disillusionment of all the beauty which shrouded us about when *we* too were children by our mother's knee.

Now, of the two attitudes which is the healthier? The

answer is ready enough. Ah! Yes! Wordsworth is indeed nature's Poet-Laureate, but to understand him well you must first have been by affliction touched and saddened; you must first have lost much of that childishness that beams on the faces of Angelico's angels and which runs like a child's laugh through the measures of a troubadour's lay.

. . . . . .

This then, is the second great characteristic quality of all medieval life—sanity, health, which is itself but the outcome of essential harmony. I will close this somewhat tedious description with a remarkable quotation from a monograph on "Botticelli," by A. Streeter. Speaking of the "Quattrocento" he says (p. 29):

"It was an age of affirmation . . . . the immediate impulse was to reject nothing that had ever claimed the allegiance of the human heart . . . . but to reassert all things afresh and harmonize them into fuller concord. And their characteristic effort was to combine all antagonistic ideals . . . . sanction the full and equal development of man's nature alike in its spiritual, its intellectual and its physical aspect. This effort found its most logical expression in what is known as the Humanistic Philosophy of which Pletho, Ficino and Pico were eminent exponents, and the essence of which has been defined as the belief that nothing that has ever interested living men and women can wholly lose its vitality. . . . The whole struggle of the early Renaissance was the struggle to find a mode of escape . . . . which should not involve the integrity of their actual beliefs and which should satisfy the highest needs of the spirit of man, while it yet allowed free scope for the uncontrolled development of his intellectual and imaginative powers. This in the realm of reason inspired the Humanist philosophy in its laborious efforts to reconcile paganism and Christianity."

We can add that such was the inspiration back of all medieval life. Otho with his dreams of a universal Empire, Aquinas writing his stupendous Summa, Urban preaching the

Crusade, Pico dello Mirandola discoursing at a Florentine Academia, Dante penning the Divina Commedia—all were inspired by a veritable passion for unity in which all things were to be harmonized and assigned their proper sphere. And though their magnificent dreams proved futile in much, nevertheless, the very effort stamped medieval character with a sanity, a sturdy robustness, a fine sense of perspective and general mental and moral health such as humanity has never since known.

III. Naïveté.

There is a third and last general characteristic of medievalism which must be noted if we are to adequately cover the ground. A quality far more delicate than the preceding, and for that reason perhaps more pleasing; a something which perhaps leads us to the very intimate heart of hearts of the Middle Ages. I call it for the want of a better word "naïveté," a sort of sweet, childlish innocence or happy boyish abandon and literalness which were a direct result, rather the ultimate expression in detail, of the preceding deeper characteristics—of its idealism which clothed in spirituality everything from an Emperor's crown down to a flower or an insect; of its sanity which, like Jacques, saw good in all things and carelessly sucked the honey of joy from them or at least looked with a child's wondering interest upon them, however insignificant, because they were harmonious parts of a great wonderful creation, in which they were all somehow intimately related one to another in a universal harmony of an all-seeing Divine Providence, parts affecting one another even when apparently disassociated, as they would be to our modern separatist and narrow method of microscopic observation.

For instance what could be more absolutely medieval and at the same time less modern than that exquisite tale of "Our Lady's Tumbler"—the poor acrobat who, as a penitent monk, not being able to sing in choir or in fact to perform any useful function, sought to please God and His sweet Mother with the

one only art he knew—that of tumbling before her statue as he was wont to do in the old wandering sinful days. How exquisitely simple and naïve! Yet how wise with the wisdom of the lilies of the field who just grow lovely in the warm sun and rains of spring—the only thing they know how to do—and yet Solomon in all his glory envied them and their simple faith and beauty. A modern circus rider converted would rather give up his one art thinking to please God by dully imitating the more educated, stripping his human heart of all its joy and grace in a vain awkward attempt to force it into the common mold, losing sight of that great truth so firmly grasped by the medieval mind that all things however mean and small have their use in God's sight—the very spirit of encyclopedism.

Or take the story told by Cæsar of Heisterbach (*Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of European History.* Edited by Dana Carleton Munro. Vol. II, No. 4, p. 19) about the little church built by bees for the consecrated Host which their owner placed in the hive to induce them to raise more honey. To a modern how superstitious! And yet what a great truth underlies the story. The truth that all things from God Himself down to the lowest in His creation are indissolubly linked by bonds of faith and love and obedience; that even the insects recognize their God, even as the burning bush near which stood Moses, and the Red Sea waters that divided at God's command—a truth somewhat childishly expressed but none the less a truth. And then too, how deliciously naïve! We moderns after all hunger for this same childish imaginative ecstacy when we adorn our green Christmas trees, pleasing ourselves with the temporary illusion of Santa Claus often with our eyes dim for brooding over our lost childhood. But your medieval man was ever a child, his heart ever young and light, his imagination ever fresh—because of his great faith that saw God in all things.

Even the dry officialdom of the Church was inspired by the same naïveté. Take for instance the formula of "Excommunication of Animals" (*Ibid.*, Vol. IV, No. 4, p. 25). A modern

listens aghast to an ecclesiastic gravely cutting off from communion with the Church of God the locusts and caterpillars that were laying waste the vineyards of Troyes unless the aforesaid pests departed from the same within six days or else amended their ways. The editor, being a modern, takes occasion to refer to the "tendency of excommunication to become a mere curse or magic rite"—that is all he can see in this instance. And yet how much delightful simplicity and poetic imagination and childish trust in Providence are also contained therein? What a sublime conception of the nature of the Church of God whose firm hand, with such tremendous audaciousness and infinite self-confidence born of faith in her divine mission, could stretch not only up to an Emperor and tear off the crown from his unworthy brow but also down to the very insects of the vineyards and bid them serve the human creatures as their Creator intended they should. What a marvellous grasp of the logical interdependence of all things in the scheme of Divine Providence. How magnificent, even if boyishly expressed, faith beside which our modern separatist concept of creation seems so small, so illogical, so disturbed, so bewildering. Then, too, how sweet! Ah! here again—it is like watching the little children playing about the Christmas tree or looking for Santa Claus stealthily creeping in through the moon-lit windows laden with toys. Yes! *that* is what we have lost—the eternal youth and childishness and boyish imagination and light-hearted joy that go with a magnificent faith. But the laborers in the vineyard at Troyes had it and I warrant they were happier and, with all due respect to the modern editor and critic, were more "enlightened."

And this spirit of naïveté runs through all the life of those wonderful centuries. The old Saxon Chronicler sees the devil "making his way" south-west towards Canterbury; Fra Salimbene wanders up and down Europe with his keen eye ever detecting the fun in life albeit he forgets not his rosary or his office; Francis of Assisi preaches to the little fishes and calls the "jewel-bedecked water" his sister and the "generous" sun his brother; Catherine of Siena, when not in consultation

with Cardinals or Popes, weaves garlands for herself and daughters out of daisies and sits among them in the fields singing for sheer joy.

In the heart of all these people whether king or pauper, monk or troubadour, runs a song. Vigorous though they were, yet somehow we cannot help looking upon them so often as just rollicking boys and girls or little children playing (somewhat roughly at times) in the big glorious garden given them by their heavenly Father ere He called them back to eternal rest in His beautiful home up in the sky-land.

Conclusion.

Such then were the three characteristic qualities of the medieval man—idealism, sanity, joyous simplicity; they mark off distinctly a man of the days of Hildebrand from a man of Cicero's days and from every man since Luther's day. There is nothing like him in the world's history. And now, looking back at him in the light of our own mistakes, can we not say that with his passing much has gone out of life that was very beautiful and very great and strong? True, we have grown older and richer and crammed with more actual knowledge, but has not humanity gained these material blessings at a terrible expense of the spiritual such as I have described? And are we not perhaps the weaker for it?

Because I call the medieval man an idealist, a child, do not draw the false conclusion that he was thereby a weakling, an impracticable dreamer, an unsophisticated idler. Why, it was precisely this idealism and simplicity of soul that gave him such tremendous strength and courage. Mark you all that he did. He carved modern European nations out of the fragments of the ruined Roman Empire, civilized the barbarous hordes that had ruined it, wrote new languages, elaborated new systems of government, discovered a newer art and architecture and philosophy, cleared the forests into fructifying fields, blazed new routes of commerce—laid the foundations for everything that we have to-day; did more than any other man

did before or has since done and did it under difficulties which to us now seem simply unsurmountable. No stronger type of man can be found in history's record. And what made him strong were precisely this healthy idealism which ever made him aim high and this boyish simplicity which kept his heart stout and undismayed by difficulties.

So then if the human race has lost these qualities—and surely we have largely lost them—then it seems just to temper our pride with the sober reflection, that, with all our progress and inventions and increased store of knowledge, we have lost much that was both beautiful and strong. Yes! We have lost much. We have lost the key to the unity of life in our mad specialism. Religion has become divorced from the practical affairs of life; art a pastime of the wealthy; work mere drudgery; politics the profession of the ward-leader; philosophy a hopeless labyrinth of irresponsible elucubrations; the once glorious world-wide Church of Christ a jargon of sects, some of them bordering on the fantastic and blasphemous—everywhere and in all things there is confusion and in consequence a strange soul-hunger. Our wealth and our knowledge are poor substitutes indeed for the idealism of a Godfrey and a Hildebrand and a Fra Angelico. Like the classic pagan of Cato's or Cicero's day, we grow ever more and more restless even with the world at our feet, or like King Midas we starve amidst our riches.

Lucian Johnston.

BOOK REVIEWS.

The Life of Cardinal Vaughan. By J. G. Snead-Cox. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1910. 2 vols. Pp. xii + 483 and 498.

The author of this biography of Cardinal Vaughan has kept faith with his readers in giving as he promised in the Preface "an absolutely candid book, without reserves and without suppressions, describing the man as he was, in his strength and in his weakness, with his gifts and his limitations." The plan which is followed of grouping the activities of the Cardinal under appropriate headings rather than following the strict chronological order of events, though without absolutely abandoning the natural sequence, allows the reader to form his own judgment regarding the character and purposes of the Cardinal as they were manifested in different emergencies. With abundant documentary sources in the form of letters and diaries of the most intimate character which unquestionably were never intended for publication, it was a comparatively easy task to reveal in a strong light the career of the English boy who ended his days as the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. No effort is made to exalt either his spiritual or intellectual attainments and no praise or flattery attached to the large measure of success which crowned his efforts. The two large volumes are made up of thirty-two chapters, all or nearly all of which are chapters in the history of contemporary English Catholicism. While the aims and ambition of the Cardinal confined his work very largely to the grinding routine of the missionary priest and bishop, the circumstances in which he labored called forth at times the manifestation of qualities which cannot fail to affect profoundly the destinies of Catholicism at large. He had no aims except for the well-being of religion and the spread of education. He established a missionary college to prepare apostles for the heathen and he strove incessantly to provide for the spiritual needs of the Catholics at home. With no endowment from nature or training to become a leader in diplomatic or intellectual circles, he shirked neither diplomacy nor controversy when the interests of religion were at stake.

For those who are not intimately acquainted with the condition of Catholicism in England or especially interested in religious or educational matters there, the chapters which will prove most entertaining

are those which deal with the Founding of the Missionary College and Society at Mill Hill and those which concern the promulgation of the Bull "Romanos Pontifices" with which Bishop Vaughan was so closely connected. The main interest of the book, however, is the personality of the man himself. His character and his creed were simple. "Herbert's Vaughan's simple rule of conduct, his easy test for Catholic loyalty was always and under all circumstances, to stand on the side of Rome. Instinctively in any controversy he would be for the Pope against all comers. To uphold and strengthen the authority of the Vicar of Christ was one of the guiding motives of his life." His actions reveal him as a singular combination of reserve and impetuousness, of ascetism and detachment joined with the most practical and businesslike instincts. He dreamed great dreams but he worked hard and successfully to make those dreams come true, and he possessed wonderful powers for collecting money. Speaking of his success in finding funds for the Cathedral in Westminster, his biographer says with truth, "Certainly among the assets of the Catholic Church in this country during the closing years of the nineteenth century the personality of the Cardinal Archbishop was not the least important." It is only natural that the Cardinal's position in matters of general interest to the Church should at times have aroused opposition and that his decision of character and a habit which he referred to himself as a "liking for prodding his neighbors" should have raised up opponents for him ; but the delicacy and tact with which those things are related ought to save the susceptibilities of those who were most opposed to him. For one distant in time and place and consequently unable to understand the fine shading of character or the minute points of controversy which are described, this biography produces an effect, which will probably be the verdict of history, when time has softened any animosities that may have arisen during the lifetime of the Cardinal, and when his monument will be found in the enduring effect that his life and zeal made on the Catholicity of England. He revived the spirit of missionary activity and gave it permanent form in his great society of Mill Hill ; he established a noble cathedral as a center for the liturgical life of the Church, and he has left the memory of a career of sincere piety, of noble and unselfish effort, and of unswerving devotion to high purposes. While very little is said regarding the Cardinal's family—in fact with the exception of the first chapters, the names of none of his relatives appear except incidentally, the description of his saintly mother is the finest portion of the work and the key to all the rest. Eliza Vaughan, to

whose piety and example the Cardinal owed everything, deserves to rank with the nobler women of an earlier time, Monica and Macrina, to whose influence the roster of Christian saints owes the names of Augustine, Basil and Gregory.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Le quinzième centenaire de S. Jean Chrysostome (407-1907) et ses consequences pour l'action catholique dans l'orient greco-slave, par le P. Cyrille Charon. Ouvrage publié par les soins du comité romain des fêtes du centenaire. Collège Pontifical Grec, 149 Via del Babuino, Rome. Pp. xvi, 413.

This remarkable work from the pen of P. Cyril Charon was published during the past year under the auspices of the Committee in charge of the celebration in Rome of the fifteenth centennial of St. John Chrysostom. The preface is by the Rev. Hugo Athanasius Gaisser, O. S. B., the learned president of the Greek College in Rome. The book is divided into six chapters and has appended an interesting collection of documents and official papers and a statistical table of the Byzantine Church, both Catholic and separated; fourteen illustrations adorn the work.

The first five chapters are devoted to a description of the well-known festivities which took place in Rome at the end of 1907 and the beginning of 1908, in which Pius X not only assisted but took an active ceremonial part, and that in Greek, in the Liturgy which takes its name from the Saint. This act by which the Holy Father showed his solicitude for the countries of Oriental Rite, cannot fail to have a powerful and far-reaching influence on Catholic action in the Greco-Slavic Orient. There is much of interest to the churchman and especially to the liturgist in these vivid descriptions of the imposing ceremonies which graced the celebration. The detailed account, especially of the Eucharistic service, containing text and translation, is invaluable for purposes of comparative liturgical reference.

Chapter VI—nearly one-half the work—deals with the prospective effects of the celebration. Under different headings are treated: the history of the famous Patriarchal See of Constantinople with all the causes of its growth and decadence; the manifestations of unity, Christian charity and Apostolic life in the Orthodox Churches; the various schisms in the Orthodox Church; a comparison between the Uniate Byzantine Church and the separated branches; and finally the progress being made at present towards unity.

The conclusion is in harmony with the rest of the book; it is a touching appeal for prayers for the reunion of the Churches. The constitutional era just being inaugurated in the Ottoman Empire seems to justify hopes for a more fruitful action of the Holy See in the Orient in the near future. Though this work may seem to the casual reader optimistic in the extreme, still to one acquainted with the Eastern Churches it is sufficiently conservative and full of interesting and important material.

PAUL SANDALGI.

La Vie et la légende de Saint Gwennole, texte publié par Pierre Allier. Paris, Librairie Bloud et Cie. s. d. Pp. 63. Prix, 0, fr. 60.

It is impossible to write the history of Brittany in the fifth and sixth centuries without devoting a large part of it to her Saints. Most of them fled from Great Britain before the invading Angles and Saxons, and appeared in the country at the head of migrating tribes. They not only evangelized the land of their adoption, but cleared the forests and became the founders of numerous towns. One of the most illustrious was Gwennolé (Winwallus) the most popular of Breton Saints. His life was written in the ninth century by Wrdisten, one of his successors, Abbot of Landévennec, a monastery founded by him. The biographer derived his information from oral tradition and existing written documents. Pierre Allier publishes in modern French Wrdisten's Life together with what is known as the legend of Ys. His purpose was not to give us a critical edition of the text, but merely to place before the reader an account of the life and the miraculous deeds of Gwennolé, and he has produced a charming little book.

N. A. WEBER, S. M.

Liturgie. I. La Dédicace des Eglises, par Jules Baudot. 3e édition. Paris, Librairie Bloud et Cie, 1909. Pp. 64.

II. Le Pallium, par Jules Baudot. 2e édition. Paris, Librairie Bloud et Cie, 1909. Pp. 64. Prix, 0, fr. 60.

These works form part of the popular liturgical collection published under the direction of Dom Cabrol, the learned abbot of Farnborough. The "Dedication of Churches" treats exclusively of the more excel-

lent and permanent form of dedication, viz., consecration. It is divided into two parts, of which the first deals with the intricate problem of the historical development of the consecration ceremonies, and the second considers, in as many chapters, the canonical, liturgical and symbolical aspects of the present rite. A similar division obtains in the little study on the "Pallium." After a brief description of its nature, the author considers, in two parts, its historical and its liturgical aspect. Although the use of the pallium is, by right, reserved to the Sovereign Pontiff, it was, at a comparatively early date, granted as a mark of special favor to archbishops and other prelates. An ecclesiastical ornament of minor importance thus helped to strengthen the bond of union between the hierarchy and the Apostolic See. Numerous references enhance the value of both studies. They are not always, however, for practical reasons, we presume, references to the latest and best editions of the works cited.

N. A. Weber, S. M.

Jehanne la Pucelle, Revue documentaire bi-mensuelle, Organe du Comité de la Statue Monumentale de Jeanne d'Arc. 6 Rue Garancière, Paris.

This alert bi-weekly, devoted solely to the glorification of Joan of Arc, has more than fulfilled the promises of its inaugural issue of January last.

One of its winsome features is the critical editing of precious MSS. that have long lain in the dust of public libraries, within the sole reach of archivists and antiquarians. Thus Canon Dunand is at present publishing serially through the pages of the magazine the oldest extant life of the youthful Saint: "Histoire inédite de la Pucelle d'Orléans, par Edmond Richter.—MSS. de 1628." Other documents are forthcoming that will make clear many of the obscure details of this brief but epoch-making life. Studies of exceptional interest also from the pen of the scholarly Canon are: "La Chronique Morosini"; "Après le Procès de Jeanne d'Arc: l'attitude du Saint Siège de 1431 à 1450"; etc.

Every number contains a review up-to-date of the publications which are monthly added to the three thousand works already written on Joan of Arc.

What, however, gives the Review its original character is that it gathers up the choicest thoughts of writers of the whole world,

inspired by the supernatural beauty of Joan of Arc. America is represented by Archbishop O'Connell's masterly articles and by Miss Rose E. Cleveland's delicate and uplifting portrayal of the valiant Maid. Poets and scholars of every tongue and tribe have promised their collaboration.

Besides being a scientific and literary contribution to the study of Joan of Arc, "Jehanne la Pucelle" is also the organ of the "Comité de la Statue Monumentale de Jeanne d'Arc." It is the staunch hope of this Committee to erect to Joan of Arc a statue of heroic size that will rival the statue of Liberty of New York Harbor and the Charles Borromeo Monument near Lago Maggiore. After much deliberation a high hill at the gate of the City of Rouen has been selected as the site upon which the bronze image of France's saintly Liberator will stand, an inspiration to every Catholic and patriotic heart. This bold project has secured the whole-hearted approval of the most distinguished members of the hierarchy in every land and the devoted coöperation of influential Catholics in both hemispheres.

It is hoped that such a noble idea will gain a wide notoriety and a still more generous support.

JOHN DELAUNAY, C. S. C.

Theories of Knowledge: Absolutism, Pragmatism, Realism. By Leslie J. Walker, S. J., M. A., sometime Professor of Philosophy at Stonyhurst College. New York, Longmans, 1910. Pp. xxxix + 696.

This is a valuable addition to the "Stonyhurst Series" already so well and favorably known to students of scholastic philosophy. In content and method, however, it differs from the volumes which have preceded it. They, or most of them at least, should be classed as text-books, and have been used with success in the class room of philosophy. The volume before us is written, apparently, for the advanced student, and enters into contemporary controversies in philosophy with such a wealth of detail and elaboration of argument that one is more inclined to set it over against Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, Schiller's *Studies in Humanism*, and James' *Pragmatism* than to give it a place beside Maher's excellent text-book, *Psychology*. Philosophical literature of this kind is very much needed. The case for scholasticism cannot be adequately argued in a text-book, in which pedagogic principles have the first claim. A certain amount of room is required in an up-to-date exposition and defense of scholastic teach-

ing, room for explanation, room for illustration, and room for refutation of current philosophical errors. This latest volume of the Stonyhurst series is on the roomy plan, and the author is to be congratulated on the success with which he has used the space at his disposal. The secondary title, "Absolutism, Pragmatism, Realism" indicates the range of topics discussed, though it does not, of course, show the details of the arrangement, some of which, for instance, the psychological analysis of cognition and the metaphysical conditions of knowledge, are among the most important contents of the volume.

The style of the work is pleasing and not too over-laden with technicalities. It is worthy of special commendation that the author, although he is quite familiar with the writings both of the absolutists and the pragmatists, has escaped the influence of the stylistic extravagances of both schools. In quotation and in exposition, naturally, he is obliged to use the jargon of the Bradleyites, and condescends occasionally to the linguistic unconventionalities of James, or to the latest phraseological façon of Schiller. In his own statement, however, and in his argument, he uses the technical language of the schools, which is neither so abstruse as that of absolutism nor so journalistic as that of pragmatic humanism. He is a proof that it is possible to be a philosopher, even a scholastic philosopher, and write good English.

It would be invidious to call attention to minor flaws in a work of undoubted merit. When, however, one reads that "Sensations as such are neither true nor false, but only become so when integrated into percepts and referred to objective Reality" (p. 28), one would like to know whether, in the author's view, a sensation may not be referred directly to its objective cause, and so become true without having been first integrated into a percept. And does not Vailinger (p. 77 and Index) stand for the well known Kantian editor and critic, Vaihinger? Again, one wonders whom the author means when he refers (p. 567) to "the French pragmatist M. Sauvage," and gives a quotation from the "Rev. Métaph et Morale, 1901, p. 144." Finally, are we to take the remarks on pp. 350, 351 as an admission of the real distinction between essence and existence in created things?

WILLIAM TURNER.

S. Thomas d'Aquin, par A. D. Sertillanges, Professeur de Philosophie à l'Institut Catholique de Paris. 2 vols. Paris, Alcan, 1910. Pp. vii + 334 and 348.

This latest contribution to the series entitled *Grands Philosophes*, which is edited by Abbé Clodius Piat, Professor of Philosophy at the Catholic Institute of Paris, brings the total number of volumes of the series up to seventeen. The publisher of the series is the well known Paris house of Alcan et Cie, and the prices of the volumes range from five francs to seven francs and a half. The volumes before us are from the pen of Father Sertillanges, the Dominican, who for several years has held the chair of scholastic philosophy at the Institute, which in everything but name is the Catholic University of France.

Father Sertillanges' work cannot be too highly recommended to all who are interested in scholastic philosophy. In writing it he had, he tells us, a twofold purpose in view. He wished, in the first place, to enlighten those Thomists whose admiration for their master is sometimes a matter of sentiment rather than a result of discriminating study, and he desired, in the second place, to present the Thomistic system of philosophy in such a way as to enlist the interest of those whose leanings in philosophical matters is towards some other master besides Thomas, or (as they think) towards no master at all. To expect that this twofold purpose shall be fulfilled to the letter would be, perhaps, to expect too much. We have no doubt, nevertheless, that Father Sertillanges will attain his purpose, at least in part. There is much in these volumes to enlighten the Thomists, and there are many things that will not fail to interest even the opponent of scholasticism. The exposition is clear, the defence able, and the illustrations well chosen. There is just a sufficiency of erudition, enough for thoroughness and not enough to give the impression of display. The style is easy, and brings to the reader the conviction that only in French could the thoughts of St. Thomas be expressed so vividly and at the same time so concisely. Much as we need a work of this kind in English, the man who tries to render Father Sertillanges' paragraphs into English paragraphs of the same length will set himself no easy task. For the student who reads French there is, so far as we know, no better introduction than this to the study of the text of St. Thomas' philosophy.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Etude sur l'imagination auditive de Virgile, thèse présentée à la Faculté des Lettres de Paris par F. X. M. J. Roiron, S. J. Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1908. 8o. pp. iv + 690.

ΚΡΙΤΙΚΑ ΚΑΙ ΕΞΗΓΗΤΙΚΑ *περὶ τριῶν* **ΟΥΕΡΓΙΛΙΟΥ ΣΤΙΧΩΝ Α 10.857, 4.430, 0.242 ΚΑΤΑ ΚΑΙΝΗΝ ΜΕΘΟΔΟΝ ΠΕΙΡΑΣΑΜΕΝΟΣ** *τῷ τῆς ἐν Παρισίοις πανακαδημείας* **Μουσείῳ παρέθηκε Φ. Ξ. Μ. Ι. ΡΟΙΡΩΝ** *ἐκ τῆς* **ΕΤΑΙΡΕΙΑΣ ΙΗΣΟΥ. ΕΝ ΠΑΡΙΣΙΟΙΣ.** Ernest Leroux, 1908. 8o. pp. ii + 94.

In the second of these theses, entirely written in Greek, the author proposes to illustrate from three verses of Vergil's *Eneid*, a new method of textual criticism, the principles of which he has already established in the first thesis. The new method seems to consist in applying to variant readings the test of two laws of the Vergilian style discovered by Fr. Roiron, to wit, the resumption of words (analeipsis rêmatôn) and the coupling of words (syneirmos rêmatôn). Vergil was in the habit of repeating over again in a given passage one or more words or syllables either entirely identical or at least similar and often in the same order; as for instance the word *nomen* which occurs five times in some form or another in a series of nineteen verses (E. 6. 758-776), *laetus*, three times in thirteen verses (G. 3. 310-322) and three times also in eleven verses (G. 3. 375-385). In E. 9. 733-751 we find *micantia* and *emicat*, *media* and *mediam*, *Turnus* and *Turnum*, *incipe* and *excepere* (both containing *capio*), *dextram* and *dextra*, *immania* and *immani*, *intorquet* and *detorsit*, *viribus* and *vi*, *telum* and *teli*, *uolnus*, *uolneris* and *uolnere*, etc. If now we turn to the first passage selected by the writer for his demonstration,

> . . . . . attollit in aegrum
> se femur et, quamquam uis alto uolnere tardat

we find that it belongs to just such a series of analeipseis rêmatôn as we have just described. This series begins E. 10. 846 and winds up E. 10. 864. *Uolnus* reappears four times, *uictus* or *uictor* three times, *uiuo* four times (all beginning with the syllable *ui* or *uo*, a favorite recurrence in Vergil). The reading *quamquam uis* in the verse 857 seems now required to complete with *uiam uis* of verse 864 this remarkable series of resumptions of

words as well as of syllables, while the reading *quamuis* would contribute solely to the analeipsis of syllables. But not only does Vergil resume in this way favorite words or syllables. He likes also to repeat them in conjunction with one another (syneirmos rêmatôn). For instance *nitor* and *hasta* are often repeated coupled together in wide apart passages. Thus also *uis* and *uolnus* and *uis* and *tardare* which again is in favor of the reading *quamquam uis*. The presence of *uis* as a separate word in the verse in question not only eliminates the proposed readings *tardet* and *ardet*, but makes the reading *quamquam* certain, thus doing away with the necessity of supplying a missing word as *dolor*(*alto*) or *cx*(*alto*).

This will suffice to give an idea of the nature of Fr. Roiron's theses, both of which ought to be read carefully by all interested in Vergil's stylistic.

H. HYVERNAT.

La religion assyro-babylonienne, conférences données à l'Institut catholique de Paris, par le P. Paul Dhorme des frères Prêcheurs. Paris, Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1910. 12o., pp. xii + 319.

This volume, the second of the *Etudes palestiniennes et orientales*, published by the Librairie Victor Lecoffre, may well be considered as a partial expansion and a complement of the *Etudes sur les religions sémitiques*, by Fr. Lagrange, in the sense that Fr. Dhorme treats exhaustively, but from the same high point of view, one of the several semitic religions so masterly sketched by the learned Director of the Ecole pratique d'études bibliques, at Jerusalem. That Fr. Dhorme was well qualified to undertake the treatment of so difficult, and we might add, of so abtruse a subject as the one to which this volume is devoted, is evidenced by the universal commendation his *Choix de textes religieux assyro-babyloniens* had received in orientalistic circles.

The book with which we are now concerned represents a course of nine lectures delivered before the Institut Catholique de Paris, during the past summer, only somewhat more developed and supplemented with quite an array of notes and references to the sources. These, however, are presented *en bloc* at the end of each

of the lectures to which they severally belong, so as not to frighten the general public, for whom the book is intended as well as it is for the specialist. The author does not attempt to treat all the aspects of the religion of the Assyro-Babylonians. He has deliberately excluded from his plan mythology, magic and divination, the importance of which, in his estimation, has been much overrated by his predecessors too anxious to prove that all religions have slowly evolved from the crudest forms of animism and fetishism. He has rather endeavored to bring to light the essentials of religious psychology with the Assyro-Babylonians, their ideas on divine beings, the relations they professed to exist between the gods and the world, the sentiments of fear and piety that religion aroused in their hearts, and how such sentiments influenced their public and private life. The book is clearly conceived and carefully written, which does not detract from its scientific character. We cannot but commend it to the attention of all students of religious antiquities and in particular to scripturists and students of apologetics.

H. HYVERNAT.

I have intended for some time writing a general review of the several volumes published in the *Nouvelle collection d'Etudes Bibliques*, by Père Lagrange and his confrères of the *Ecole pratique d'études bibliques* at Jerusalem. Owing to various circumstances I have not yet been able to carry out this design, and lest the readers of the *Catholic University Bulletin* should suffer from further procrastination, I now wish briefly to mention, at least such of those volumes as to the matter of which I am less incompetent.

1°. Etudes sur les religions sémitiques, par le Père Marie-Joseph Lagrange des Frères Prêcheurs, deuxième édition revue et augmentée. Paris, Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1905. 8o., pp. xvi + 527.

The author studies more particularly the aspects under which the Semitic religions stand in more striking resemblance or contrast with the religion of the Israelites. The fact that this work was crowned by the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres speaks highly for its merits.

Points treated: Origin of religion and mythology, the Semites, the gods and goddesses, saintliness and impurity, sacred things and persons, sacrifice, the dead, Babylonian myths (cosmogony, poem of creation), Phenician myths.

2°. Le Messianisme chez des Juifs (150 av. J. C. à 200 ap. J. C.), par le P. M-J. Lagrange des Frères Prêcheurs, Paris, Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1909. 8o., pp. viii + 349.

I have myself too much to learn from the author on Messianism, to do aught but encourage others to read it.

Divisions of the book and chief points treated: I. Messianism according to hellenistic Jewish writers (Josephus and Philo). II. Messianism according to apocryphal Apocalypses.—Cosmic eschatology (temporal, transcendental); Messianic eschatology (historic, transcendental); synthetic eschatology. III. Messianism according to Rabbinical Pharisæism,—kingdom of God; future life; resurrection; Messianic times; the Messias (coming of Elias; names, nature of the Messias; the Son of Man; manifestation of the Messias); the suffering Messias and the Messias son of Joseph.—Apocalyptic and rabbinism compared. IV. Messianism in action.—Attitude of Judaism toward the Gentiles; attitude of the masters toward Christianity (opinion of rabbis on Jesus; discussions between rabbis and Christians); Messianic disappointments (after the ruin; wars under Trajan; Messianic war; Judaism in Arabia).—Epilogue.—Various documents Greek and Hebrew.—Indices.

3°. Canaan d'après l'exploration récente, par le P. Hughes Vincent des Frères Prêcheurs. Paris, Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1907. 8o., pp. xii + 495.

By *exploration récente* the author understands above all the excavations uninterruptedly carried on in Palestine since 1890, mainly by the Palestine Exploration Fund and the Deutscher Palestina Verein; and also all surface archæological investigations for the past fifty or more years. The treatment is perfectly thorough and the exposition is remarkably clear.

Divisions and chief points treated: History of research in Palestine, and general archaeological principles (introductory)—Canaanitic cities (how situated, built and fortified); Places of worship in Canaan (pre-Canaanitic of the neolithic period and Canaanitic sanctuaries); idols, cultual objects and religious practices; the dead (sepultures of various periods—neolithic, Canaanitic, Israelitic; the tomb and its furniture, funerary offerings)—Ceramic of various periods (indigenous up to XVI. century; Aegeo-Canaanitic, XVI–XII. century, Israelitic, XII–IX. century, Judeo-Hellenic, IX–V. century. Geology and prehistoric archaeology; the place of Canaan in general history—copious indexes of Biblical quotations, contents and illustrations.

4°. Choix de textes religieux assyro-babyloniens, transcriptions, traduction, commentaire, par le P. Paul Dhorme des Frères Prêcheurs. Paris, Victor Lecoffre, 1909. 8o., pp. xxxvii + 406.

Biblical scholars who of late have heard so much of the great profit that can be derived from the modern discoveries in Babylonia and Assyria for the right understanding of history as contained in the Bible, will certainly welcome a book which allows them to study the most important religious texts of those two ancient countries in their forms as definitely established by the latest and best critics. The texts transliterated into the current modern alphabet are accompanied with a French translation and a philological commentary. They include such documents as the poems of creation, various cosmogonies, all the texts relating to the deluge, the epic of Gilgamesch, the myths of Etana and Adapa, the descent of Ishtar to Hades, various psalms and hymns and several other religious texts. Most of those documents are to be found in the *Mythen u. Epen* of Professor Jensen. Here, however, they are more complete and the author had the advantage of some valuable recent publications. The book opens with a general introduction and closes with an index of the proper names.

5°. Le livre des Juges, par le P. Marie-Joseph Lagrange des Frères Prêcheurs. Paris, Librarie Victor Lecoffre, 1903. 8o., pp. xlviii + 338.

The sections of the introduction concerning textual criticism and chronology of the book of Judges as well as the French translation and philological commentary, are excellent. All we can say of the section on literary criticism (not being competent in that line) is that it contains a luminous exposition of the many various theories so far excogitated to solve the much debated question of unity of composition in this book.

H. Hyvernat.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Ecclesiastical Music at the University.

The Catholic University has this year undertaken the work of creating a school of genuine ecclesiastical music, with a view to putting into practice the earnest wishes and the wise legislation of Pius X. Its new Instructor in Ecclesiastical Music, the Reverend Abel L. Gabert, was born August 4, 1861, at Longechenal in the diocese of Grenoble, France, and from his earliest youth has been an ardent student of religious music. After his ordination to the priesthood in 1884 he was for ten years music professor, organist and choirmaster in the College of La Cote Saint André. Later, his bishop, Monsignor Fava, sent him to Paris for more thorough training. For seven years he was organist and choirmaster at Notre-Dame-du-Travail, and for six years at the important church of St. Peter's Neuilly-sur-Seine, a large suburb of Paris. In 1907, at the invitation of his friend, the late Dean Flynn, he came to the United States as choirmaster for the Church of the Assumption, Morristown, New Jersey.

In all, Abbé Gabert has devoted some thirty-five years of his life to the science of ecclesiastical music. He is a disciple of the Spanish "maestro" Joseph Alemany, one of the great masters of religious music, a man of profound knowledge, noble character and pure faith, and of Alfred Rabuteau ("Grand Prix de Rome" in 1868), both of whom led the young composer through all the mysteries of the highest musical processes. The Gregorian Chant always found in the Abbé Gabert a resolute and skillful champion, especially since the appearance of "Les Melodies Gregoriennes" of Dom Pothier. He is a specialist in Gregorian Chant, and for three years (1898-1900) conducted his own review, the "Avenir de la musique sacrée," and is now one of the writers on the new "Revue gregorienne francaise" of Dom Mocquereau. He is intimately convinced, however, that daily practice is far better than any amount of writing. In the College of La Cote Saint André he transformed into a large choir his community of 200 pupils, and had the whole community every day singing choral music in four parts, to say nothing of their beautiful Gregorian perform-

ances during liturgical offices. In Notre-Dame-du-Travail, Paris, along with the work of choir training, he developed in a high degree the practice of congregational singing. At Morristown, N. J., on feast days, he added a large gallery choir to the regular sanctuary choir. His fluency of musical composition is an efficacious auxiliary to his musical apostolate: indeed, as he wrote the music for his many singers, he was able to utilize fully their abilities, without ever going beyond them. The masses he wrote for the double choir of Morristown are a striking illustration of the musical possibilities afforded by any parish of medium standing.

The leading idea of Father Gabert's life is "A Musical High School and Academy, for the benefit of the clergy, in order to provide some priests, were it only one in each diocese, with the highest religious musical training and to make them, each one in his own neighborhood, leaders in ecclesiastical music, in connection with the central Academy, the secondary duty of which would be to unify, and direct, and protect the whole body of musical workers." Since 1892 Abbé Gabert has cherished this idea and in 1894 interested so deeply his own ordinary, Bishop Fava of Grenoble, that he sent the young musician to Paris to prepare for the work. But the politico-religious condition of France forbade the execution of his plans, and after thirteen years' service in two of the larger churches of Paris he came to this country at the invitation of his friend, Dean Flynn of Morristown, N. J., and in that parish for the last four years acted as organist and choirmaster. He retained, nevertheless, his original hopes for the creation of a central school of ecclesiastical music, and when in October, 1910, he was called to the Catholic University, there seemed a chance of realizing the plans of twenty years' standing.

In the United States, so far, there are few, if any, places, in which our future organists and choirmasters may receive their proper musical training; and there are no places where they may specialize in Gregorian chant and Liturgy. The Catholic University of America seems the best place for the creation and development of such a school.

Meanwhile the special duty of the new Instructor in Ecclesiastical Music is to prepare the way and to quicken the time, and that by musicalizing the place itself where the work is intended to start. His first care has been to gather the musical forces of

our affiliated Religious Houses, and to put them in touch with one another. On October 4, some fifty students had a meeting in Divinity Hall for the preparation of the solemn opening of the University with the Mass of the Holy Ghost, October 9. They were handed plain-chant books of the Vatican Edition, and invited to practise the pure Gregorian Chant. Several of our affiliated Religious Houses had already followed the pure Gregorian Chant for years; and the Musical Instructor was delighted to realize that these students were able to sing very well at sight. The Mass of October 9 was a success. Every Sunday the High Mass is sung according to the same Vatican Edition, in our Divinity chapel, by our Divinity students, with the help, by turns, of one of our Religious Houses: in this way, the Gregorian training will progressively pervade the whole body of the University, and heighten its liturgical life.

Unfortunately, the Divinity chapel is very small, as it was intended only for Divinity Hall, and we are obliged to limit the number of our singers for ordinary offices. If we had a large chapel, we could every Sunday gather a very large male choir of clerical and lay students, and afford splendid liturgical offices, in accordance with the importance of the University. God grant us the large chapel of our dreams, and the Gregorian training will take on in this place a wonderful development. Just now, the general gathering of our musical forces cannot take place, except on the more solemn feasts that bring together the whole University.

The rehearsal of October 4 gave Father Gabert an idea of the musical capacities of the University. For the Feast of the Immaculate Conception, December 8, he planned the composition of a mass in figured music, for male voices in two choirs: first choir, tenor I, tenor II, and bass; second choir in unison for voices of medium range. On October 5, he started his composition; on October 26, the vocal score was printed; and immediately, all the groups of singers, including many lay students, were invited to rehearse apart, then to attend general rehearsals during the last days before the feast. This new mass, inspired by the good will of our students, and written for them, and enthusiastically prepared by them, added a special interest to our feast of the Immaculate Conception. It was the first attempt of the kind in this place: let us hope it will not be the last. Sometimes good works are symbols, and the new mass seems to represent the cohesion of the apparently scattered, but really well connected,

musical forces of the University. In many of our parishes the choristers sing, and the congregation listen and do not participate in religious singing. Now a mass for two choirs is an open invitation to congregational singing. In many of our seminaries, a select body of a few students practise plain-chant or figured music, while the community itself refrains from musical exertion and training in spite of the importance of such a matter for future priests: a mass for two choirs is a direct invitation to community singing.

The new mass composed for the University, with its second choir in mere unison of medium ranged voices, would be very practical and effective in seminaries, the select singers singing the first choir, and the community devoting their care to the second. In matters of the kind, the main point is to get easy music, adapted to the voices, written for the purpose. And this is precisely the case with the mass written for our students.

When the full score of this mass is published the *Catholic University Bulletin* will make known the fact. We may add that the growing enthusiasm of our students for true Gregorian Chant allows the Abbé Gabert to begin in January, a series of lectures on the traditional music of the Church, its history, nature and practice. In this way some at least of our future parish priests will be enabled to control and help the work of their organists and thus aid in carrying out the wishes of our Holy Father Pius X for the restoration in all churches of the true ecclesiastical music.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Public Lectures. Shortly after the opening of the University the free public lectures, which during the last Academic year proved so attractive to the students and also to the people of Washington, were resumed. The Fall course, which has just closed, consisted of a series of seven lectures, three of these being a study of the life and writings of Dante. All were given before a very large audience and were well received. The lecture of Bishop Burke, of St. Joseph, Missouri, on Dante and The Papacy, was an admirable apology for the Catholic faith of the great Florentine exile. Bishop Burke, it is well known, has few if any superiors in the English-speaking world in all that pertains to the writings of Dante. He is equally esteemed at home and abroad for his intimate knowledge of all Dante texts. Dantists of the calibre of Professor Poletto, the well known commentator on the *Divina Commedia,* hold in the highest esteem both the erudition and the judgment of Bishop Burke on all questions connected with Dante and his times. A very large attendance from the city of Washington gave evidence of the attractiveness of the subject, and all present were delighted with the Bishop's handling of it. The students, in particular, were present in large numbers and a very large delegation from Trinity College enjoyed this rare treat. It is worthy of note that during 1910 six Dante lectures have been given at the University. They form an excellent introduction to the study of the great Catholic poet, philosopher and theologian, and for the first time gave him due public honor at the National Capital. The following is a list of the lecturers and their subjects:

October 20—Spanish American Literature.
Rev. Charles W. Currier, Ph. D.

October 27—South America: Its Peoples and its Problems.
Rev. Charles W. Currier, Ph. D.

November 3—The Development of Writing and Printing.
Mr. Frederick B. Wright.

November 10—Italian Literature before Dante.
JOSEPH DUNN, PH. D.

November 17—Dante and The Papacy.
RT. REV. MAURICE F. BURKE, D. D.

December 1—Symbolism of Dante.
REV. WILLIAM TURNER, D. D.

December 15—Some English Women Writers of the Fifteenth Century.
PATRICK J. LENNOX, B. A.

During the next three months the following lectures will be delivered, forming the Winter Course of Public Lectures:

January 5—The Catholic Church and the Prohibition Movement. [Father Matthew Lecture.]
VERY REV. A. P. DOYLE, C. S. P.

January 12—The Ruined Cities of Asia Minor. [Illustrated.]
DAVID M. ROBINSON, PH. D.

January 19—The Work of the Public Library in the District of Columbia.
MR. GEORGE F. BOWERMAN.

January 26—The Power of Example in Temperance Reform. [Father Matthew Lecture.]
REV. PETER J. O'CALLAGHAN, C. S. P.

February 2—Socialism: An Interpretation.
REV. WILLIAM J. KERBY, PH. D.

February 9—Is the State a Divine Institution?
REV. JAMES J. FOX, S. T. D.

February 16—Medieval Guilds and Education.
VERY REV. EDWARD A. PACE, S. T. D.

February 22—George Washington.
CHARLES H. MCCARTHY, PH. D.

March 2—Economic Significance of Socialism.
FRANK O'HARA, PH. D.

March 9—Moral Aspects of Social Problems.
REV. JOHN W. MELODY, S. T. D.

March 16—The Doctrine of the Fathers on Private Property.
VERY REV. CHARLES F. AIKEN, S. T. D.

March 23—The Materialistic Interpretation of Early Christian History.
REV. P. J. HEALY, S. T. D.

March 30—Communistic Societies in America.
CHARLES H. MCCARTHY, PH. D.

Mr Herbert G. Squiers, formerly United States Minister to Panama and a convert to the Catholic Church, has donated two Scholarships, worth Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars each. These Scholarships are available to worthy lay students for a period of ten years. The present holders are Edward Dan-

naher of Nashville, Tenn., and Vincent Scully of Albany, N. Y. Mr. Squiers has chosen a most efficient way of rendering service to the Catholic Church. Our non-Catholic universities abound in such means of helping, entirely or in part, worthy youth. It is notorious that many of the men now foremost in every walk of American life obtained their collegiate education through the aid of some generous patron. It is to be hoped that many Catholics will follow the admirable example of Mr. Squiers and endow in perpetuity or by annual gift numerous scholarships for the deserving graduates of our Catholic high schools and colleges.

The Catholic Educational Review. An important step forward has been taken by the University in arranging for the publication of a periodical dealing with the problems of education from a Catholic standpoint. "The Catholic Educational Review" will appear in January and each month thereafter with the exception of July and August. It is primarily an outgrowth of the Department of Education which the University Trustees desire to build up; but in its larger scope it will include all that affects the welfare of our Catholic schools, academies and colleges. It will also give due consideration to the various movements in the educational field, to methods, historical questions, current discussions, new textbooks and courses of study. Quite naturally, the teaching of religion will hold a prominent place in its pages. Generally speaking, the aim is to keep our teachers informed in regard to everything that marks an advance in education and at the same time to insist on Catholic principles as the soundest that any school can adopt.

What first suggested this publication was the desire of the University to make its work helpful to the thousands of devoted men and women who are keeping alive the spirit of Christianity in our parochial and elementary schools, to uphold them in their struggle against materialism and in their keen competition with other schools. The project was therefore explained in a circular sent out last summer; and it is very gratifying to note

that it met with cordial approval on all sides—the Hierarchy, the religious orders and the pastors who bear the burdens of our most important institution, the parochial school.

From foreign countries also, notably from the Bishops, the most encouraging letters have been received, showing that, as Catholics, we have a common cause, of world-wide interest, to support. There is, consequently, every reason to hope that the new "Review," while it is an evidence of progress on the part of the University, will find ample justification in the service it renders to education of the right sort, to religion and to the Catholic Church.

New Instructors. Two new members have recently been added to the teaching staff of the University. Mr. J. B. Parker, a graduate of Ohio State University and formerly of the Kansas State Agricultural College, has been appointed instructor in the Department of Biology. His courses, for the present, deal with general biology but gradually will extend to various important fields of special biological research. Mr. Amri Brown, a graduate of Harvard (1902) has been appointed instructor in the School of Law and together with Judge De Lacy carries on the undergraduate work of this Department. There are at present seventy-four students, graduate and undergraduate, attending the courses in Law. Besides his regular classes in Law, Judge Robinson, Dean of the Law School, is at present conducting a course for priests on the Law of Personal and Family Rights and next semester will give his usual course in Legal Oratory. Judge Robinson is one of the most distinguished of our American law teachers, a convert to the Church of many years standing, and when called to the University at its inception was one of the most beloved professors in Yale University. He is the author of several text-books, the latest of which, "Elements of American Jurisprudence," is one of the manuals most largely used by students of law in all parts of the United States.

NECROLOGY.

Rev. Ambrose McNulty.

The Alumni of the Catholic University of America, especially those of them who were among the first students at Caldwell Hall, will learn with deep and sincere sorrow the news of the death of Father Ambrose McNulty at St. Paul, Minn. Ambrose McNulty was born at Darwin, Minn, in 1869. He made his early studies at the school of his native district, from which he went to St. Thomas' College, St. Paul, and later to St. John's University, Collegeville, Minn., for his studies in classics, philosophy and theology. The years 1890-1891 he spent as post-graduate student of theology at the Catholic University of America. After his ordination in 1891 he was successively pastor at Ortonville, Minn., assistant at St. Joseph's Church, St. Paul, and secretary to Archbishop Ireland. In 1896 he was appointed pastor of St. Luke's Church, St. Paul, where he remained, honored, revered and loved by all his parishioners until his death, November 28, 1910. He was for many years editor of the *Northwestern Chronicle*, in the editorial pages of which he gave evidence of unusual ability as a writer and a thinker. With great talents of the intellectual order he combined exceptionally amiable qualities of heart. His career was singularly successful in the lines of duty marked out for him; his priestly zeal, his ready sympathy, his power to make and keep friends, and his splendid courage amid many sufferings marked him as an exceptional man whose natural gifts and acquired accomplishments were devoted without stint to the service of God and of His Church. Father McNulty was a faithful friend of the Catholic University, and by word and deed promoted its interests whenever he had an opportunity of doing so. May his gentle, generous soul rest in peace!

Michael Cudahy, Esq.

By the death of Michael Cudahy, Esq., at Chicago, November 27, the Board of Trustees has lost one of its most devoted members and the Catholic University a sincere friend and a signal benefactor. His rugged but direct and natural character, his honesty of purpose and action, his gifts of perseverance and organization, and his business foresight and courage are too well known to insist on them here. Despite the temptations of great wealth he never ceased to live as befitted a sincere Catholic, and by word and example gave evidence at all times that his religious faith was a living and efficient element of his daily life. From its inception he was a generous benefactor of the Catholic University which owes to him the Michael Cudahy Chair of Mathematics, improved library facilities, and frequent contributions to its support. Unostentatious in manner and frank and simple in speech, he was always deeply concerned for the superior training of our younger clergy, and was wont to say that he considered it the most important part of the work of the University. He has left behind him something more durable and worthy than earthly possessions, the memory of an upright, believing soul, a heart that was never closed to the needs of the poor and the lowly, and a life replete from beginning to end with good deeds whose number is surpassed only by the quiet, self-effacing way in which he executed them. May he rest in peace!